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PUBLIC LAWYERS, PRIVATE VALUES: CAN,
SHOULD, AND WILL GOVERNMENT
LAWYERS SERVE THE PUBLIC INTEREST?
STEVEN K., BERENSON *
Abstract: There is a widely shared perception among lawyers, judges,
and various public officials that government lawyers have greater
responsibilities to serve the public interest than lawyers in private
practice. This perception is reflected in judicial opinions, lawyer
professional responsibility standards, and numerous other legal
writings. Nonetheless, a number of academic critics have attacked what
is described here as the "public interest serving" role for government
attorneys. This Article provides a defense of the public interest serving
role against its critics. While the critiques addressed are diverse, they
often make the mistake of importing values from the context of private
litigation into the quintessentially public context of government
litigation. The Article concludes by offering three examples of the most
common forms of government litigation—criminal prosecutions,
lawsuits against executive branch agencies, and civil enforcement
proceedings—in an effort to demonstrate how the public interest
serving role ought to be pursued.
INTRODUCTION
It is an uncontroversial proposition in mainstream American le-
gal thought that government lawyers have greater responsibilities to
pursue the common good or the public interest than their counter-
parts in private practice, who represent non-governmental persons
and entities. Indeed, this proposition finds expression in numerous
historical sources, including both primary sources such as judicial
opinions and statutes, and secondary sources. Similarly, the proposi-
tion has been incorporated into formal statements of appropriate
professional roles and responsibilities for attorneys such as model
standards for attorney professional conduct and discipline. Perhaps
the best known example of the proposition conies in the assertion
* Assistant Professor, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University. The
author wishes to thank Tony Chase, Catherine Claypoole, Michael Dale, Todd Rakoff, and
Deanna Sampson for reviewing and commenting on earlier drafts of this article.
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that criminal prosecutors are to "seek justice" rather than convictions
in particular cases, a view which has been endorsed by the United
States Supreme Court in its famous decision in Berger v. United States,'
as well as incorporated into the two most widely adopted codifications
of appropriate attorney professional roles and responsibilities: the
American Bar Association's Model Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity;2 and its Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 3
There appears to be a broad consensus among practicing lawyers,
current and former public officials, and persons involved in legal
policymaking at a variety of levels, that what. will be referred to in this
article as the "public interest serving" role for government attorneys is
the appropriate professional role for such attorneys to play. Despite
this consensus, the public interest serving role for government attor-
neys is controversial among, and indeed has generally been attacked
and rejected by, the relatively small number of legal academics of who
have written seriously about appropriate professional roles and re-
sponsibilities for governMent attorneys. These critics of the public
interest serving role for government attorneys have argued that gov-
ernment attorneys cannot, should not, and will not work to advance
the public interest to any greater degree than attorneys for non-
governmental entities.
Some critics of the public interest serving role for government
attorneys argue that government attorneys cannot work to pursue the
public interest because the very concept of a "public interest" is unin-
telligible and cannot provide a workable guidepost for government
attorneys with regard to the choices and decisions that they must
make in their professional roles.`' Other critics argue that even if the
concept of a public interest is sufficiently intelligible to provide guid-
ance to government attorneys in their professional decision making,
government attorneys should not attempt to pursue their conceptions
of the public interest in their professional capacities. 5 In the criminal
context, such critics argue that efforts by prosecutors to serve the
public interest rather than to do everything possible to secure convic-
I 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1945) [hereinafter Berger].
2 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1969).
3
 MODEL ROLES OP PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 cum 1 (1983).
4 See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Thal Practice: Can Prose-
cutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 48 (1991).
5 See, e.g., Geoffrey Miller, Government Loners' Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances,
54 U. Ctn. L. REV. 1293, 1294' (1987) [hereinafter hillier, Government Lavers]; Peter L.
Strauss, The Internal Relations of Government: Cautionary Tales From Inside the Black Box, 61
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 155, 156-57 (1998) [hereinafter Strauss, Internal Relations].
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dons will tip the balance in criminal trials in favor of defendants and
their attorneys, who do not operate within similar constraints. 6 In the
civil context, the critics contend that it would be anti-democratic for
government attorneys to pursue their particular determinations of
the public interest with regard to any particular legal controversy, and
that any determinations regarding how the public interest will best be
served with regard to any legal controversy should be made by public
officials who are more democratically accountable than government
attorneys are,? Finally, some critics of the public interest serving role
for government attorneys argue that even if government attorneys
can and should work to pursue the public interest they will not do so, 8
Rather, this group of critics contends that government attorneys will
work to advance their individual; financial, or career-related self in-
terests at the expense of the broader public interest.
These critiques have not been made by an organized group of
scholars. Although law and economics perspectives—including ra-
tional choice and public choice theories—predominate, the critiques
have been informed by a variety of different theoretical perspectives.
In any event, certain commonalities exist among the critiques, and
certain broad thematic similarities can he discerned. Foremost is the
primacy of what will be referred to here as "private" values. For pur-
poses of this article, the term "private" values encompasses ideas such
as individual choice, autonomy, and pursuit of economic self-interest.
These values lie in contrast to what will be referred to throughout this
paper as "public" values, For purposes of this article, the term "pub-
lic" values encompasses ideas such as connection to others, commu-
nity, collective action, group interaction, and discourse.
The purpose of this Article is to provide a defense of the public
interest serving role for government attorneys against the above out-
lined critiques. The Article will examine traditional understandings
and formal pronouncements regarding the public interest serving
role for government attorneys in three specific contexts: criminal
prosecutions; representation of government agencies; and govern-
ment attorneys engaged in civil enforcement actions. 9 In each con-
text, the focus will be on lawsuits or litigation involving government
See, e.g., Dr. George T Felkcncs, The Prosecutor: A Look at Reality, 7 Sw. IL L. Rev. 98,
119 (1975) (discussing actual Prosecutors' attitudes).
7 See, e.g., Miller, Government Lanyers, supra note 5, at 1295.
8 See, eg., Jonathon Macey & Geoffrey Miller, Reflections on Professional Responsibility in a
Regulatory State, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1105, 1115-17 (1993).
9 See infra Part 1.
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entities, although many of the observations may apply equally well to
other types of government legal work. The Article will then present a
summary of the critiques as they pertain to each of the three govern-
ment lawyering contexts addressed.w Next, the Article will offer re-
sponses to each of the various critiques.n In doing so, the Article will
draw some general conclusions regarding the inappropriateness of
importing private values into quintessentially public lawyering con-
texts. Additionally, it will be presumed that given the firm establish-
ment and longstanding recognition of the public interest serving role
as the appropriate one for government attorneys, the burden of proof
ought to lie with those who would abandon that role in favor of a dif-
ferent view of the appropriate professional role and responsibilities
for government attorneys. It is hoped that through the above de-
scribed analysis, a more concrete vision of appropriate government
lawyer roles and responsibilities will emerge. This vision will finally be
compared and contrasted to the competing vision offered by the cri-
tiques in the context of three particular government lawyering prob-
lems. 12
I. TRADITIONAL UNDERSTANDINGS AND FORMAL STATEMENTS OF THE
PUBLIC INTEREST SERVING ROLE
Both traditional understandings and formal statements of the
professional role of government attorneys, whether serving as crimi-
nal prosecutors, attorneys for executive branch agencies, or attorneys
engaged in civil enforcement of public protection laws, view serving
the public interest as a significant component of that role. For exam-
ple, courts and commentators from the earliest days of the American
legal system to the present have viewed pursuit of the public interest
as a critical function of the public prosecutor." It has long been the
view in American law that the prosecutor's paramount duty is to serve
justice, rather than to secure a conviction in a given case. As stated by
the Supreme Court of Tennessee in an 1816 opinion:
[The prosecutor] is to pursue guilt; he is to protect inno-
cence; ... to combine the public welfare and the [safety] of
citizens, preserving both, and not impairing either; he is to
decline the use of individual passions and individual malevo-
I° See infra Part II.
' 1 See infra Part III.
12 See infra Part IV.
13 See infra notes 14-21 and accompanying text.
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lence,.when he cannot use them for the advantage of the
public; he is to lay hold of them where public justice . , . re-
quires it."
In his famous 1854 essay, which is considered to represent one of the
foundations of modern legal ethics codes, 15 George Sharswood con-
trasted the role of defense attorneys, who are to do their utmost in
defense of their clients, regardless of their own views regarding their
clients' guilt or innocence, with that of public prosecutors, who must
never prosecute a person known Or believed to he innocent. 16 No less
an authority than the United States Supreme Court, in a frequently-
quoted passage from its now-famous opinion in Berger v. United States,
stated that the prosecution's interest "is not that it shall win a case, but
that justice shall be done. ..."17 More recently, the author of a leading
book on prosecutorial ethics stated that laJlthough the government
technically loses its case, it has really won if justice has been done." 18
The formal rules of professional responsibility that govern the
conduct of public prosecutors have codified the traditional view that
the paramount duty of the prosecutor is to serve the public interest.
The American Bar Association's Standards Relating to the Administra-
tion of Criminal Justice, The Prosecution Function, state that "[t]he
duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict." 19 This
language is identical to that which appears in Ethical Consideration
7-13 of the American Bar Association's Model Code of Professional
Responsibility.2° The comment to the more recent Model Rules of
Professional Conduct similarly refers to prosecutors as "minister[s] of
14 route v. State, 4 Tenn.(3 Hayw.) 98, 99 (1816), quoted hi JOHN JAY DOUGLAS. ETHI-
CAL ISSUES IN PROSECUTION (2d ed. 1993).
115 See Russell Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of Legal Ethics Codes, 6 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 241, 243 (1992).
16 See HON. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY IN PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (FIB. Rothman
5th ed. 1993) (1854), cited in Bruce Green, Why Should Prosecutors Seek Justice?, 26 FORM IAM
URB. L.J. 607, 612-13 (1999) [hereinafter Green, Serk Justice).
17 295 U.S. at 88. In Berger; the defendant's conviction for conspiracy to utter counter-
feit notes was reversed on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct, including misstating facts
and witness testimony the cross-examination of wimesses, improper suggestions of per-
sonal knowledge on the part of the prosecutor, and improper jury argument. Id. at 84.
Charles Wolfram refers to the Berger opinion as "the locus classicus of the extraordinary
ditties of a prosecutor." CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETIIICS 760 (1986).
19 DOUGLAS, supra note 14, at 8.
19 STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, The Prosecu-
tion Function, 3-1.2(c) (1992).
"MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1969).
794	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 41:789
justice," and makes reference to the aforementioned ABA Standards
for the prosecution function. 2 '
Similarly, both traditional understandings and formal statements
of the professional role of attorneys who represent executive branch
agencies in civil litigation suggest that such attorneys should be much
more concerned with pursuit of the public interest than their coun-
terparts who represent private clients. Courts recognize increased re-
sponsibilities to serve the public interest on the part of government
agency attorneys. For example, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit has stated that "government counsel have a
higher duty to uphold [than private lawyers] because their client is
not only the agency they represent but also the public at large."22 The
same court also noted that "government attorneys . have special
responsibilities to both this court and the public at large." 23 Indeed, in
a 1992 opinion, then District of Columbia Circuit Chief Judge Mikva
applied the principle set forth in the Supreme Court's Berger opinion
to a case litigated on behalf of the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission (FERC). 24 Chief Judge Mikva excoriated FERC's attorney for
pursuing an appeal after it had clearly become moot, and for "so un-
blushingly denying] [at oral argument] that a government lawyer has
obligations that might sometimes trump the desire to pound an op-
ponent into submission." 25
Commentators have also discussed the fact that government
agency attorneys have been thought to have a greater duty to serve
the public interest than their counterparts in private practice. Prior to
taking the bench, Judge Jack Weinstein wrote that the obligation of
government lawyers to their agency clients is "tempered by the fact
that [the lawyer] has a deeper obligation to the public. ..." 26 Later,
Judge Weinstein and another commentator similarly noted that "gov-
ernment lawyers represent not only the government entity, but also
21 MODEL Ruts OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 cwt. 1 (1983).
22
 Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 716 F.2d 23, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
23
 Douglas v. Donovan, 704 F.2t1 1276, 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
24 See Freeport-McMoRan Oil & Gas Co. v. FERC, 962 F.2d 45, 47 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Af-
ter quoting the Supreme Court's language, Mikva noted that while "[Ellie Supreme Court
was speaking of government prosecutors in &Ted, ... no one, to our knowledge (at least
prior to oral argument) has suggested that the principle does not apply with equal force to
the government's civil lawyers...." Id.
25 Id. at 48.
26 Jack B. Weittsiein,itidiritt/Nolice and the Duty to Disclose Adverse Information, 51 lowA L.
REv. 807, 810 (1966).
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the public. . ."27 And former Attorney General Griffin Bell once
wrote that lallthough our client is the government, in the end we
serve a more important constituency: the American people. "28
A recent and noteworthy expression of the public interest serving
conception of practice by government attorneys representing execu-
tive branch entities conies from Independent Counsel Kenneth
Starr's grand jury investigation of President Clinton's relationship
with Monica Lewinsky. Judge Starr sought to compel the grand jury
testimony of Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey regarding
certain conversations that Lindsey had with President Clinton. 29
Lindsey had refused to answer questions regarding such conversations
on grounds of the attorney-client privilege." While the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit was willing to accept the ex-
istence of an attorney-client privilege that protects from disclosure
certain communications between government attorneys and individu-
als working within executive branch agencies, 31 the court was not will-
ing to extend that privilege to the context of grand jury questions re-
lating to the possible commission of federal crimes by government
officials and others. 32
27 jack B. Weinstein & Gay A. Crosthwaite, Some Reflections on Conflicts Between Govern-
ment Larqers and Clients, 1 Toon° L. Rev. 1, 4-5 (1985).
22 Griffin Bell, The Attorney-General: The Federal Government's Chief Lanyer and Chief Litiga-
tor or One Among Many?, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1049, 1069 (1978), quoted in William Joseph-
son & Russell Pearce, Whom Does the Government Loner Owe the Duty of Loyally W7ten Cli-
ents Are in Conflict?, 29 HOWARD 14. 539, 555 (1986).
29 hi re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert, denied sup nom. Office of
President v. Office. of Independent Counsel, 525 U.S. 996 (1098).
3° Id.
31 See id. at 1105.
" See id. at 1107. In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit had previ-
ously ruled that the White House could not invoke the attorney-client. privilege to avoid a
grand jury subpoena from the Independent Counsel for documents relating to a meeting
involving White House lawyers and First. Lady Hillary Rodbam Clinton during the earlier
stages of the Independent Counsel's investigation, which focused on the "Whitewater" real
estate transaction, See In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1997). cert. de-
nied sub nom. Office of President v. Office of Independent Counsel, 521 U.S. 1105 (1997).
However, the dissenting judge essentially agreed with the view that would later be ex-
pressed by the D.C. Circuit in In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d at 1102, by contending that the White
I-louse should be afforded an attorney-client privilege, but that the privilege should give
way in the context of a federal grand jury investigation of purported criminal activity. See
In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d. at 925. For further discussion of these cases and is-
sues surrounding a government, attorney-client privilege, see Michael Stokes Patilson, Who
"Owns" the Governments Attorney-Client Privilege?, 83 MINN. L. Rev. 473 (1998); Adam M.
Child, Note, In Defense of the Government Attorney-Client Privilege, 84 CORNELL L. Rev. 1682
(1999); and Bryan S. Gowdy, Note, Should the Federal Government Have an Attorney-Client
Privilege?, 51 FLA. L. Rev. 605 (1999).
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The court based its reasoning, at least in part, on the view that
government attorneys owe their primary allegiance to the public in-
terest, rather than to the particular government officials they may be
representing in a given case. In the words of the court: "The obliga-
tion of a government lawyer to uphold the public trust reposed in
him or her strongly militates against allowing the client agency to in-
voke a privilege to prevent the lawyer from providing evidence of the
possible commission of the criminal offenses within the govern-
ment."33
 The court then went on to note that the government
official's interest in engaging in full and frank communications with
his or her lawyer, which admittedly might be chilled by the ruling,
could be served by the official's retention of private counsel. 54
 The
Supreme Court declined to review the Court of Appeals' decision. 35
The traditional understanding of the public interest serving role
for attorneys for governmental entities lies in sharp contrast to tradi-
tional understandings of the appropriate professional role for attor-
neys for private parties. While traditional understandings of the ap-
propriate role for attorneys for private parties do acknowledge some
responsibility on the part of such attorneys to take into account the
public interest, this responsibility is greatly subordinated to the attor-
neys' responsibility to advance the individual self interests of their cli-
ents. 36
 Indeed, a frequently quoted statement of the professional re-
sponsibility of the lawyer for a private party contends:
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one
person in all the world, and that person is his client. To save
that client by all means and expedients, and at all hazards
and costs to other persons, ... is his first and only duty; and
in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the
torments, the destruction which he may bring upon others.
" In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d at 1109. The Eighth Circuit similarly relied, at least in part, on
a conception of the public interest serving role of government agency attorneys, in refus-
ing to extend the attorney-client privilege to the White House in the context of that mat-
ter. Sean re Grand furs Subpoena Duces Tenon, 112 F.3d at 920 (stating: "111 he general duty
of public service calls upon government employees and agencies to favor disclosure over
concealment. The difference between the public interest and the private interest is per-
haps, by itself, reason enough to find Upjohn [Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981)
(recognizing an attorney-client privilege for corporations) J unpersuasive in this case").
34 See In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d at 1112.
33 SeeOffice of President v. Office of Independent Counsel, 525 U.S. 996 (1998) (deny-
ing sub nom. writ of certiorari).
33 See Steve Berenson, Politics and Plurality in a Lazuyer's Choke of Clients: The Case of
Stropnicky v. Nathanson, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1,40-46 (1998).
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Separating the duty of a patriot from that of an advocate, he
must go on reckless of consequences, though it should be his
unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion. 37
An instructive example of the different professional roles traditionally
accorded to government and private lawyers lies in the Solicitor Gen-
eral's practice of "confessing error" before the Supreme Court. Pur-
suant to this practice, the Solicitor General will, on occasion, admit
that a lower court decision in favor of the government entity repre-
sented by the Solicitor General was erroneous and should be va-
cated. 38 David Strauss properly points out that confessions of error by
attorneys on behalf of private parties are "essentially unheard of." 39
To the extent that they address the question at all, formal state-
ments of attorney professional responsibility vary a good deal in terms
of their formulation of the appropriate professional role to be served
by lawyers for government entities." Often, these differences are dis-
cussed in terms of identification of "the client" of the government
lawyer. The number of possible answers to the question of "who is the
client of the government lawyer" suggests the difficulty of arriving at a
single, correct answer to the question. Roger Cramton has suggested
five possible "clients" of the government attorney: (1) the pUblic in-
terest; (2) the ,government as a whole; (3) the branch of government
in which the lawyer is employed (e.g., executive, legislative, or judi-
cial); (4) the particular agency or department in which the lawyer
works; and (5) the responsible officers who make decisions for the
agency. 41 Another possible answer exists where the lawyer is employed
37 WOLFRAM, supra note 17, at 580, (quoting 2 TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 8 (1821)).
For a detailed discussion of the context within which Lord Brougham uttered this state-
ment, as well as a discussion of the debate among scholars whether the sentiments ex-
pressed continue to represent the prevailing view of current lawyers, see Catherine J, Lanc-
tot, The Duty of Zealous Representation and the Federal Government Langer?: The Three Hardest
Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. Ray. 951, 960 & nn.27-30 (1991).
33 See Thomas W. Merrill, High Level, "lintured" Langers, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. Pmts. 83,
96 (1998); David A. Strauss, The Solicitor General and the Interests of the United States, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 165, 169 (1998) !hereinafter Strauss, The Solicitor General]; David M.
Rosenzweig, Note, Confession of Error in the Supreme Court by the Solicitor General, 82 GEO. L.J.
2079 (1994). •
"Strauss, The Solicitor General, supra note 38, at 169.
40 A number of commentators have noted the paucity of consideration given to gov-
ernment lawyers in formal codes of professional responsibility. See, e.g., Lanctot, supra note
37, at 967; James Harvey III, Note, Loyalty in Government Litigation: Department of justice Rep-
resentation of Agency Clients, 37 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 1569, 1592 (1996).
41
 Roger C. Cramton, The Langer as Whistleblowe• Confidentiality and Government Langer;
5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 291, 296 (1991).
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by a different agency from the one that is represented as a party to the
litigation; for example, where a lawyer who works for the Department
of Justice or a state attorney general's office provides legal representa-
tion to another executive branch agency that is a party to a lawsuit. 42
In such circumstances, the client might be viewed as being the em-
ploying "legal" agency rather than the agency party to the case.° Ad-
ditionally, it has been suggested that the President Wright, in fact, ap-
propriately be viewed as the client whenever a federal agency is
involved in litigation.'"
Support can be found for a number of these conflicting positions
in formal opinions and codes of attorney professional responsibility.
For example, in an early effort to answer the question of who is the
client of the government attorney, the Federal Bar Association's
Committee on Professional Ethics, in a 1973 Opinion, stated that the
government lawyer's client "is the agency where he is employed."45
The Federal Bar Association (FBA) carried forward this view in its
subsequent Federal Ethical Considerations,46 which were intended to
supplement the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility as it
pertained to lawyers involved in federal practice, including federal
government lawyers,47 as well as in its later Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct for Federal Lawyers, 48 which were similarly intended
to supplement the provisions of the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct as they pertain to federal lawyers.49
As pointed out above, this formulation leaves open the question
of whether the client is the Department of Justice or the litigant
agency in the situation where an attorney employed by the Depart-
ment of Justice provides legal representation to another executive
branch agency. A comment to the most recent draft of the Restate-
ment of the Law Governing Lawyers seems to resolve this difficulty by
suggesting that in most cases the client of the government lawyer will
42 See Lanctot, supra note 37, at 1003-04 & n.204.
45 See Harvey, supra note 40, at 1570.
44 See id.
45
 Federal Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 73-1 (1973).
46 Federal Bar Ass'n Federal Ethical Considerations (1973), in C. Normand Poirier, The
Federal Government Lauyer and Professional Ethics, 60 A.B.A. J. 1541,1542-44 (1974).
47
 See id. FEC 5-1 (stating: "The immediate professional responsibility of the federal
lawyer is to the department or agency in which he is employed").
48
 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR FEDERAL LAWYERS (Federal Bar Ass'n
1990), reprinted in SELECTED STATUTFS, Ruus AND STANDARDS ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION
568 (West 1994).
49 See id. Role 1.13 (entitled: The Federal Agency as the Client") (stating: IA] Gov-
ernment lawyer represents the Federal Agency that employs the Government lawyer").
July 2000]	 Public Lawyers, Private Values 	 799
be the agency involved in the underlying dispute. 50 Similarly, the
comment to the FBA's Model Rule on confidentiality seems to suggest
that the agency party is the client.51 On the other hand, the most
widely adopted source of professional responsibility standards for law-
yers, the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 52 appear to take
the position that the government lawyer's client is the government as
a wbole.53 And by carrying forward its "seek justice" language from
the context of criminal prosecutions to the context of civil litigation,54
the ABA's Model Code of Professional Responsibility caused at least
one writer to conclude that the Code recognizes the client of the gov-
ernment lawyer to be the public interest. 55
There is some logic in attempting to define the appropriate pro-
fessional role for lawyers for government entities by first identifying
the lawyer's client. As Roger Cramton points out, it is common to view
identification of the lawyer-client relationship as a predicate to de-
termining the lawyer's duties. 56 For example, the lawyer's fiduciary
duties, as well as the lawyer's duties of competence, confidentiality,
diligence, and loyalty are all viewed to flow from the establishment of
an attorney-client relationship." However, it may be the case, given
the numerous and sometimes conflicting duties placed upon lawyers
for government entities," that identification of the client is not criti-
cal, or even helpful, in determining the government lawyer's appro-
priate professional role. Indeed, one commentator has effectively ar-
gued that the question of who is the client of the government lawyer
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 156 cunt. C (Tent:101'C Draft
No. 8, 1997) (entitled "Representing Governmental Client"). The Restatement suggests
that a definitive answer regarding who is the client of the government attorney may vary
according to the circumstances. See id.
64 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR FEDERAL LAWYERS, Supra note 48,
Rule 1.6 cmt. (stating: "Generally, a federal agency is the government. lawyer's client for
purposes of this Rule").
52 "As ofinly 1999, 41 states and the District of Columbia had adopted some version of
the Model Rules." GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING
15 (3rd ed. 1999).
66 MODEL RUES OF PROFESSIONAL Cortnue'r Rule 1.13 elm. (1983) (stating: "Although
in some circutnstmwes the client may be a specific agency, it is generally the government as
a whole").
54 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-14 (1969) (staling: "A gov-
ernment lawyer in a civil action or administrative proceeding has the responsibility to seek
justice").
55 See Harvey, supra note 40, at 1594,
56 See Cramton, supra note 41, at 296.
57
 See id.
68 See id, at 297.
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has obfuscated, rather, than clarified, the important issues surround-
ing attorney representation of government entities. 59
Thus, it is not important to demonstrate conclusively that the
public interest is "the client" of the attorney representing governmen-
tal entities in order to show that formal pronouncements of attorney
professional responsibility incorporate the public interest serving role
for government lawyers. What is clear from a review of these pro-
nouncements is that all of these codes contemplate a greater duty on
the part of government attorneys to serve the public interest than is
imposed upon attorneys for private parties. For example, in addition
to the Model Code's admonition to civil government attorneys to
"seek justice, "60
 the Preamble to the Model Rules states that lawyers
for government agencies "may have authority to represent the 'public
interest' in circumstances where a private lawyer would not be author-
ized to do so."61 Both the FBA's Federal Ethical Considerations62 and
its Model Rules for Federal Lawyers" expressly recognize special du-
ties to serve the public interest on the part of government lawyers.
And the comment to the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers
notes the fact that "Haulms have stressed that a lawyer representing a
government client must seek to advance the public interest in the
representation."64 Thus, while it may be debated whether a particular
code embodies a stronger or weaker version of the public interest
serving role for government attorneys, it is beyond doubt that all such
codes encompass some version of the public interest serving role for
attorneys for govermnent entities.
In addition to the situation in which government attorneys repre-
sent particular governmental entities in litigation, government attor-
59 See Robert P. Lowry, Who is the Client of the Federal Government Latter?: An Analysis of
the Wrong Question, 37 FED. BAR. J. 61 (1978).
6° See supra notes 19-20.
°I
 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble 1 16 (1983).
02 See Federal Ethical Considerations, supra note 46, FEC 6-1 (stating that the federal
lawyer's duty to represent a client competently must "be fulfilled with special regard to the
public interest").
65
 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR FEDERAL LAWYERS, supra note 48,
Preamble (stating: "In addition to the high standards of conduct expected of all Federal
lawyers, the Government lawyer has it specific responsibility to strive to promote the public
interest").
" RESTATEMENT (Thum) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 156 am. f (Tentative Draft
No. 8, 1997) (entitled: "Representing Governmental Client").
July 20001	 Public Laren., Private Values	 801
neys frequently act to enforce laws that have been enacted to protect
the public from harms in a variety of areas, including civil rights and
environmental and consumer protection enforcement. In such cir-
cumstances, traditional understandings and formal pronouncements
regarding the government attorney's responsibility to serve the public
interest are even clearer than in the contexts discussed previously.
Perhaps the traditional understandings of the public interest serving
role of the government attorney who enforces public protection laws
do not have as lengthy a history as those relating to criminal prosecu-
tors and attorneys for executive branch entities. Following from the
tradition of the British Attorney General, the earliest American public
lawyers were seen in the role of "apolitical" and "elite" legal counsel
for the government. 65 However, as the role of American government
in general expanded through the New Deal and Great Society periods
of the 1930s and 1960s to encompass a wide range of public protec-
tion functions not previously seen to be within its ambit, so too has
the role of government attorneys who work in similar areas. 66 Not only
is this true at the federal level, but state attorneys general have come
to play an increasingly large role in the enforcement. of state laws de-
signed to protect the public in areas ranging from child support en-
forcement, consumer protection, antitrust action, and rate and utility
regulation and advocacy, to the provision of services to crime victims
and environmental enforcement. 67
Formal pronouncements similarly recognize the public interest
serving role of civil enforcement government attorneys in a variety of
settings. Although the statutes that define the authority and role of
the United States Attorney General are very broad and quite vague,
title 28, section 518, of the United States Code states that the Attorney
General may argue any case in any court in the United States when
the Attorney General believes doing so is in the interests of the
United States. 68 Both constitutional provisions and statutes establish-
ing the authority of the primary government attorneys at the state
65 See CORNELL W. CLAYTON, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE: 1 -HE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND
THE MAKING OF LEGAL POLICY 11 (1992).
66 See id. at 4-5.
67 See generally STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES (Lynne M.
Ross ed., 1990).
613 28 U.S.C. §518 (1998).
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level, state attorneys general, 69 as well as other government lawyers,"
similarly incorporate the public interest serving perspective.
II. THE CRITIQUE OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST SERVING ROLE
Numerous commentators have questioned whether government
lawyers are capable of advancing the public interest. The commenta-
tors' critiques of the effectiveness of the public interest serving role
for government attorneys fall into three general categories. First,
some commentators assert that the concept of the public interest is
unintelligible and therefore cannot provide a workable guide to gov-
ernment attorney conduct in particular cases.'" Second, other com-
mentators argue that even if government attorneys are capable of act-
ing to advance the public interest, it is inappropriate for them to do
so." Third, arguing from the perspective of rational choice theory,
other commentators contend that government lawyers will not place
the public interest (even to the extent that it is intelligible) ahead of
their individual self interests in the context of particular cases." Each
of these critiques will be explored with regard to the three categories
of government attorneys that are the focus of this article.
A. Government Attorneys Cannot Serve the Public Interest
Numerous commentators have argued that the concept of the
public interest is too ill-defined to be particularly useful in establish-
ing appropriate professional roles for government lawyers. Fred
Zacharias advances this thesis in an important article regarding the
ethics of prosecutorial trial practice. 74 Zacharias, who refers to prose-
cutors' duty to serve the public interest as the "do justice standard,"
69 See, e.g., 15 ILL. Comp. STAT. 205/6.5 (West 1997) (creating Consumer Utilities Unit:
within the Office of the Attorney General, with the power to intervene in, or initiate pro-
ceedings relating to the provision of electric power, when the Attorney General determines
that doing so is in the interest of Illinois' citizens); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 4
(West 1997) (authorizing State Attorney General to enforce state consumer protection act
in order to protect the public interest).
7°
 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 350.0611 (West 1999) (establishing "Public Counsel" to
represent the public interest in proceedings before the Florida Public Service Commission
involving the setting of utility rates); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 408.40 (West 1999) (establishing
"Public Counsel" to promote die public interest in proceedings before the Florida Agency
for Health Care Administration).
71 See infra notes 74-95 and accompanying text.
72 See infra notes 96-112 and accompanying text.
75 See infra notes 113-137 and accompanying text.
'4 See Zacharias, supra note 4, at 48.
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contends that the standard "establishes no identifiable norm." 75 He
contends that the standard's "vagueness leaves prosecutors with only
their individual sense of morality to determine just conduct." 76 This
ambiguity, he concludes, makes the likelihood that prosecutors will in
fact advance the public interest completely unreliable. 77
. Zacharias recommends replacing the "do justice standard" with
the requirement that prosecutors. assure "adequate adversarial proc-
ess" in criminal trials. 78 To do this, prosecutors must assure that the
essential elements of the adversary process do not fail." For example,
a failure of one of the essential elements of a fair criminal trial takes
place where the defendant lacks adequate counse1. 8° According to
Zacharias, in cases where the defendant is not being represented ade-
quately, the prosecutor may have a duty to inform either defense
counsel or the trial judge of defense counsel's inadequate perform-
ance in order to restore proper adversarial balance to the case. 81 On
the other hand, in situations where the essential elementS of adversar-
ial balance are in place, the prosecutor may go all out for a conviction
without regard to the substantive fairness of such a result. 82
The purported unintelligibility of the public interest serving role
has also been decried in the context of government attorney repre-
sentation of executive branch entities. For example, Cramton quotes
from the report of a special committee of the District of Columbia Bar
Association appointed to study application of the Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct to government lawyers, 88 stating that "the public
interest [is] too amorphous a standard to have practical utility in
regulating lawyer conduct."84 According to Professor Geoffrey Miller,
" See id,
78 Id.; see alto George 'I'. Frampton jr.„S'onieNactical & Ethical Problems of Prosecuting Pub-
lic Officials, 36 Mo. L. REV. 5, 8 (1976) (stating that "more often than not, the prosecutor is
thrown back on his own subjective values").
77 See Zacharias, supra note 4, at 48.
Sre id. at 60.
78 See id.
B0 See id. at 66. Other failures of essential elements of a fair criminal trial identified by
Zacharias include: grossly unequal resources between the prosecution and the defense;
biased and overactive tribunals; decisions based on nonevidentiary considerations; im-
proper jury selection procedures; improper denials of access to witnesses; and improper
opening and closing arguments. See id, at 74, 85, 88, 90, 95.
al See id. at 72.
82 See Zacluulas, supra note 4, at 53.	 '
83 Report by the District of Columbia Bar Special Committee of Government Lawyers
and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct [hereinafter D.C. Bar Report, repnlard
-rim WASH. LAWYER, Sept.—Oct. 1988, at 53.
84 Cramton, supra note 41, at 299 (quoting D.C. Bar Report, supra note 83, at 10).
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the "notion that government attorneys represent some 'transcenden-
tal public interest' is incoherent." 85
 Similarly, Professors William Jo-
sephson and Russell Pearce contend "that for a government lawyer,
the 'public interest or community at large . . . is a vague and meaning-
less abstraction. It is impossible to represent the community which is
always divided.'"86
 Following up on this view, Professor Catherine
Lanctot asks, if the government attorney is to represent "the people"
or the public interest, which "people" does the attorney actually rep-
resent?87
 Is it those people who would not want their tax dollars
wasted on litigation that is unlikely to be successful? 88 Or is it the peo-
ple who voted for the present administration and would presumably
support the agency's position on the matter in issue? 89
The argument that the public interest serving position is inco-
herent can also be made in the context of civil enforcement proceed-
ings initiated by government lawyers. This version of the unintelligi-
bility argument can be made using the terminology of public choice
theory. Simply stated, public choice theory rejects the notion of an
overriding pubic interest. Individual interests are not viewed as being
amenable to aggregation in any fair sense. 9° At most, what occurs is
the aggregation of collections of similar individual interests into "in-
terest groups" or "factions" (to use Madison's term). 91 Within our
governmental system, policymaking (including the making of policy
through civil enforcement proceedings) is subject to "capture" by
such interest groups, resulting in policies that favor the minority of
the population represented by the particular interest groups, rather
than the majority of the population, or the broader public interest,
which is shut out of the policp. naking process.92 For example, it has
been argued that the Federal Trade Commission has been "captured"
by the business interests it regulates, resulting in antitrust enforce-
ment policies that unduly favor producers over consumers and the
85 Geoffrey Miller, Government Lauryers, supra note 5, at 1294.
HG Josephson & Pearce, SUM? note 28, at 564 (quoting Douglas Sale, The City Attorney's
Relationship with Council and Staff- Determining ilho is the Client in Day-to-Day Affairs, 11 CUR-
RENT Mum PROBS. 10, 11 (1984)).
87 See Lanctot, supra note 37, at 1005.
88 See id.
89 See id.
9D See Frank Easterbrook, The Slate of Madison's Vision of the Slate: A Public Choke Perspec-
tive, 107 14ARv. L. REV. 1328, 1339 (1994) (citing KENNETIII ARROW, SOCIAL. CHOICE AND
INDIVIDUAL VALUES 2-6, 59-60, 89 (2c1 ed. 1963)).
91
 See id. at 1333.
97 See id. at 1341.
July 2000]	 Public Lawyers, Private Values 	 805
public interest." It has also been argued that the meat and poultry
industries have captured the United States Department of Agriculture
and the Food Safety Inspection Service by preventing the enactment
of meat and poultry inspection regulations, 94 and that certain Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency contractors have captured the Super-
fund program."
B. Government Attorneys Should Not Attempt to Serve the Public Interest
Even if we assume for the moment that government attorneys are
capable of identifying and pursuing a coherent public interest, a
number of commentators argue that government attorneys should
not attempt to do so. This argument takes different forms in the con-
text of criminal and civil government litigation. In the context of
criminal prosecutions, the normative argument against the public in-
terest serving or "do justice" role for public prosecutors is based
largely on the adversarial system. This argument focuses on the fact
that, whether appropriately or inappropriately, defense attorneys will
use virtually all means available to secure acquittals for their clients. 96
On the other hand, prosecutors face a number of systemic hnpedi-
ments to their ability to obtain convictions. Of course, the greatest
such impediment is the requirement in criminal cases that prosecu-
tors prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Addi-
tional impediments include the requirements that criminal charges
be based on probable cause, that defendants he informed of their
right to counsel, that prosecutors,not seek to obtain waivers of impor-
tant pretrial rights from unrepresented defendants, and that prosecu-
tors disclose exculpatory evidence or evidence that would tend to
mitigate punishment of the defendant." The normative argument
95 See, e.g., id. at 1342.
94 See generally Dion Casey, Agency Capture: The United States Department of Agriculture's
Struggle to Pass Food Safety Regulations, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POCY 142 (1098).
95 See generally Bradford C. Mank, Superfund Contractors and Agency Capture, 2 N.Y.U.
L.J. 34 (1993).
96 See generally William Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 Mien. L. REv. 1703
(1993) (endorsing some, but not all, examples of what the author refers to as aggressive
defense). See also Green, Seek Justice, supra note 16, at 618.
97 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,364 (1970) (stating: "we explicitly hold that the Due
Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged").
98 See Green, Seek Justice, supra note 16, at 615-16 & nn.29-36. On the other hand, it is
equally clear that prosecutors enjoy a number of systemic advantages that tend to counter-
act the advantages enjoyed by defendants in criminal litigation. Such prosecutorial advan-
tages include the ability to conduct gnind jury and police investigations, unique prestige
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against the public interest serving role for prosecutors contends that
in order to preserve balance in our adversarial system and to ensure
that guilty defendants are in fact convicted, prosecutors must "fight
fire with fire" and counter aggressive defense tactics with vigorous ef-
forts to secure convictions.9g To such commentators, the public inter-
est serving role for prosecutors unduly tilts the playing field in favor
of aggressive defendants.
The argument that lawyers for government agencies ought not
attempt to serve the public interest is largely based on notions of
democratic accountability and separation of powers. With regard to
the former, it has been argued that because attorneys who represent
government entities in litigation are generally appointed it would be
anti-democratic fOr such attorneys to advance their own determina-
tions of how the public interest will best be served in the context of a
given case over those of other executive branch officials who are also
involved in the case, and who are more democratically accountable to
the electorate)" With regard to separation of powers issues, it has
been argued that the government attorney who follows the public in-
terest serving role usurps the authority of the legislative and judicial
branches of government. 101 For example, the government attorney
who refuses to pursue litigation on grounds that the agency's position
is contrary to prior court decisions usurps the role of the judicial
branch. 102
 Similarly, the attorney who refuses to defend agency action
on grounds that the agency has exceeded the scope of its authority
usurps the legislative function of delegating authority to the executive
branch agency to act in the first place. 1 °3
A final argument why government attorneys should not attempt
to serve the public interest can be illustrated in the context of civil
enforcement proceedings. Simply stated, efforts by government at-
torneys to serve the public interest may backfire. Peter Strauss offers
and symbolic power with judges and jurors, and great advantages in available resources (at
least when compared to the typical criminal defendant). See Zacharias, supra note 4, at 59;
see also Green, Seek Justice, supra note 16, at 625-26.
u9
 There is certainly evidence that as a descriptive matter, many prosecutors in fact be-
lieve that they must abandon the public interest serving Rile and do whatever possible to
secure convictions, in order to maintain balance in the criminal justice system. See genera!!,
Dr. George T. Felkenes, The Prosecutor: A Look at Reality; 7 Sw. U. L. Rev. 98 (1975) (empiri-
cal study showing tendency of prosecutors to view conviction as the ultimate end to be
pursued).
140 See, e.g., Josephson & Pearce, supra note 28, at 565; Lanctot, supra note 37, at 985.
01 See Cramton, supra note 41, at 298.
102 See Miller, Government Lawyers, supra note 5, at 1296.
10
 See id.
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an example from the extensive litigation regarding the transportation
of radioactive waste from the Brookhaven National Laboratory on
Long Island through New York city during the 1970s and 1950s. 1"
New York City, through its Health Code, had enacted an ordinance
that would have prohibited the transportation of radioactive waste
through the City from the National Laboratory. 105 According to
Strauss, who served as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's General
Counsel at the time, this action both obstructed interstate commerce
and threatened the existence of a national laboratory. 1 °6 Thus, there
was at least some basis for direct judicial relief. 1°7 On the other band,
the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act had granted the Depart-
ment of Transportation the authority to issue regulations regarding
the transportation of hazardous materials such as those at issue in the
dispute, as well as the authority to preempt any conflicting state or
local regulations. 1" The Department, although it had not yet acted
pursuant to its statutory authority, was in the process of doing so."
Thus, allowing the statutorily-created administrative process to run its
course existed as an alternative to a direct judicial enforcement action
against the New York City rules. According to Strauss, the decision
whether to file suit fell into the hands of a relatively inexperienced
Assistant United States Attorney in the United States Attorney's office
for the Southern District of New York.n° Despite considerable public
and pcilitical support in favor of the City's policies, the AUSA decided
to sue and, not surprisingly, lost." ] The litigation continued for more
than a dozen years, without the federal government gaining further
ground. 112
C. Government Attorneys Will Not Serve the Public Interest
Even if government attorneys can and should work to serve the
public interest, a number of commentators have argued that govern-
104 See Strauss, Internal Relations, supra note 5, at 156-57. Reported decisions in this
saga include: New York v. United States Dept. of Trans., 539 F. Stipp. 1237 (S.D.N.Y. 1982),
rev 'd, 715 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 465 U.S. 1055 (1984):
and New York v. United States Dept. of Trans., 700 F. Stipp. 1294 (S.D.N.Y 1988).
102 See Strauss, Internal Relations, supra note 5, at 156.
106 See id.
107 See id.
100 See.id.
100 See id.
110 See Strauss, Internal Relations, supra note 5, at 157.
ill See id.
112 see id.
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ment lawyers will not do so. 115 Such arguments are largely based on
rational choice and other economic theories, and they contend that
government attorneys will act to pursue their own individual self in-
terests, which often conflict with—rather than advance—the public
interest. In the context of criminal prosecutions, the argument has
frequently been made that prosecutors seek to advance their own ca-
reers at the expense of the "do justice" ideal.'" More than thirty years
ago, in a seminal article criticizing the practice of plea bargaining,
Albert Alschuler argued that the practice of plea bargaining serves
the individual interests of prosecutors rather than the interests of jus-
tice. 115
James Eisenstein, in his study of United States Attorneys' offices,
states that "the overwhelming majority of Assistant United States At-
torneys seek the position not for the inherent rewards of public serv-
ice, but for the boost it can give subsequent careers." 116 One author
offers as a particularly egregious example of this practice then-United
States Attorney for the Southern District of New York Rudolph Giu-
liani's insider trading prosecutions of high-flying Wall Street
financiers Michael Miliken and Ivan Boesky." 7 Daniel Fischel con-
tends that Giuliani went after Miliken and Boesky to curry favor with
more traditional Wall Street powers who resented having been routed
by Miliken and Boesky. 118 In turn, these Wall Street powers allegedly
supported Giuliani in his successful campaign to become Mayor of
the City of New York. 119
Even at a less rarefied level, the argument has been made that
lawyers in local district attorney's offices will work to advance their
personal interests rather than the public interest.'" For example, it
113 See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 8, at 1115-17 (offering several reasons why gov-
ernment agency attorneys will advance their own personal interests rather than the public
interest).
114 See, e.g., Albert Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV.
50,105 (1968-69); Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: StipulatingAway Prosecu-
torial Accountabili ly?, 83 VA. L. REv. 939,966 (1997); Stephen J. Schulhoffer, Criminal Justice
Discretion in a Regulation System, 17J. LEGAI. STUD. 43,50-52 (1988).
115
 SeeAlschttler, supra note 114, at 105.
I16 JAMES EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED STATES: U.S. ATTORNEYS IN THE Po-
LITICAL AND LEGAL SYSTEMS 174 (1978).
117 See DANIEL R. FISCHEL, PAYBACK 98,111-12 (1995).
118 See Daniel NI. Kahan, Reinterpreting Interpretive Criminal-Lawmaking Power Within the
Executive Branch, 61 LAW CONTEMP. PROBS. 47,52 (1998).
118 See id.
120 See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 114, at 106; Richman, supra note 114, at 966; Schul-
hoffer, supra note 114, at 50-52.
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has been argued that because advancement and promotions within
such offices are often based upon conviction rates, prosecutors will
seek to maximize convictions rather than "do justice." 121
 Similarly,
elections for prosecutorial positions have been said to involve discus-
sion of conviction rates so that candidates for prosecutorial offices will
also seek to maximize convictions rather than do justice. 122
The argument that government lawyers will not work to advance
the public interest has also been made in the context of attorneys who
represent government agencies. 123 In their article Reflections on Profes-
sional Responsibility in a Regulatory State, Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey
Miller offer several reasons why gOvernment agency attorneys will ad-
vance their own personal interests rather than the public interest. 124
First, because market forces do not operate on government attorneys
the way they do on attorneys in the private sector, government agency
attorneys are likely to engage in inefficient activities such as being
overly litigious and engaging in career building. 125 Young lawyers, who
join the government in an effort to gain valuable experience, are
more likely to litigate cases than would be the case in the private sec-
tor, where easily identified clients and other market constraints would
prevent them from doing so. 126 Furthermore, agency attorneys who
desire to go on to careers in the private sector are likely to be "cap-
tured" by the law firms that appear before them, and offer unduly fa-
vorable treatment to such firms and their clients at the expense of the
public interest. 127 Additionally, consistent with theories of "turf-
building" by agencies, Macey and Miller argue that government at-
torneys will work to expand the power of the agencies they work
within vis-ci-vis other governmental entities, and that government at-
torneys will unduly favor legal solutions to public problems so as to
enhance their own importance within the agencies in which they
work. 128 Of course, neither of these activities is likely to serve the pub-
lic interest.
Finally, the argument that government attorneys will not work to
pursue the public interest has also been made in the context of civil
181 See Alschtiler, supra note 114, at 106; Richman, supra note 114, at 966; Schulhoffer,
supra note 114, at 50-52.
122
 Richman, supra note 114, at 966.
122
	 Macey & Miller, supra note 8, at 1115-17.
124 See id .
125
	 id. at 1115-16.
128 Sre id. at 1117.
127 See id.
128 See Macey & Miller, supra note 8, at 1119,
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enforcement actions. 129 In his recent article, Public v. Private Enforce-
ment of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and Employment, Michael Selmi
compared the results attained by government and private attorneys in
cases brought under fair housing and anti-employment discrimination
legislation.'" Based on an empirical analysis of the results in numer-
ous cases brought within these categories, Selmi contends that while
government attorneys generally win a higher percentage of the cases
they bring in these areas, private attorneys tend to obtain higher
damage awards in the cases that they do win."' This leads Selmi to
conclude that at least in the context of civil rights enforcement, gov-
ernment attorneys bring small claims in insignificant areas of the law,
whereas their private sector counterparts bring more "cutting edge"
and large-scale cases.'"
Sehni accounts for these differences, at least in part, in terms of
government attorneys placing their own personal interests ahead of
the public interest in strong civil rights enforcement. 1 " For example,
Sehni claims that attorneys who are interested in becoming career
government attorneys seek to avoid controversial cases, and instead
seek cases "to which the government would not likely object or about
which the government is unlikely to come under political scrutiny or
pressure.""4
 This usually means small-scale and uncomplicated
cases."5 On the other hand, attorneys who go to work for the gov-
ernment primarily to obtain experience with the intent of moving
into private practice after a few years, will similarly prefer smaller
cases because they are more likely to he given substantial responsibil-
ity with regard to such cases than with regard to larger-scale and more
complicated cases."6 In shOrt, Selmi argues that the personal priori-
ties of individual government attorneys cause them to be less effective
in serving the public interest implicated by civil rights laws than at-
torneys in the private sector are."7
129
 See, e.g., Michael Sehni, Public Lt Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing
and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1901,1404 (1998).
13° Id,
' 31 See id. at 1419-20,1934.
132 See id. at 1904.
133 Other reasons that Selmi gives for the differences in litigation outcomes include
lack of incentives for government attorneys to pursue large damage awards that they will
not personally profit from and frustration with government work that will cause "true be-
lievers" in civil rights to leave government employment. See id. at 1443-44.
131 See Sehni, supra note 129, at 1444.
135 See id.
156 See id. at 1445.
137 See id. at 1443-45.
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D. Public Lawyers, Private Values
As can been seen from the above discussion, the scholarly cri-
tique of the public interest serving position has not been offered by
an organized group of scholars and encompasses a variety of ap-
proaches and theoretical orientations. However, there are certain
commonalities among the critiques. For purposes of discussion, I will
label these commonalities in terms of a primacy of private over public
values. 138 By using the term private values, I simply refer to value
schemes that place the indOdual at the center of the scheme. 139 Such
schemes tend to view persons as being "individualistic, self-interested
and in a state of undeclared war [with one anotherl." 190 By contrast,
public value schemes, as that term is used here, place persons acting
together at the center of the scheme. 141 Such schemes tend to view
158 In using this terminology, 1 do not intend to make any grand statements as to the
viability of the public/private distinction. I am well aware of the longstanding, voluminous,
and often highly effective critique that has been launched regarding the public/private
distinction. It has been nearly two decades since the Pennsylvania Law Review published its
influential symposium edition regarding the distinction, see Symposium, The Public-Private
Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289-1602 (1982), in which Professor Duncan Kennedy art-
fully noted that "fw]hen people hold a symposium about a distinction, it seems almost
certain that they feel it is no longer a success. Either people can't tell how to divide situa-
tions up between categories, or it no longer seems to make a difference on which side a
situation falls." Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U.
PA. L. REV. 1349, 1349 (1982). Since that time, additional writings have served to further
undermine the distinction. See generally Alan Freeman & Elizabeth Mensch, The Public-
Private Distinction in American Law and Life, 36 Burr. L. REV. 237 (1987); Donald Pongrace,
A Symposium of Critical Legal Study. Stereotypification of the Fourth Amendment's Private/Pubhc
Distinction: An Opportunity for Clarity, 34 Ass. U. L. REV. 1191 (1985). Nonetheless, even if
the distinction no longer holds at its margins, or even well inside of them, the distinction
provides a useful descriptive device for analyzing some of the important differences be-
tween the critiques of the public interest serving position discussed previously, and the
defense of the public interest serving position that will be discussed. CI generally Ruth Ga-
vison, The Public/Private Distinction in Feminism, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1992) (suggesting that
complete rejection of the public/private distinction may be counterproductive).
1 " It is important to be precise about what one has in mind when using the pub-
lic/private terminology. Karl Mare identified at least four different sets of connotations
that can be associated with the terms public and private. See Karl Mare, The Public/Private
Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1358, 1358 & n.2 (1982). These arc: (1) open
versus intimate; (2) the realms of work and government versus the realms of social and
family life; (3) personal versus that which concerns others; and (4) the state versus civil
society. Id. Ruth Gavison, in turn, also identities font' senses in which the terms can be
used: (1) accessible versus inaccessible; (2) freedom versus interference; (3) individual
versus society; and (4) a complex clusters of senses combining the previous three in vari-
ous ways. Gavison, supra note 138, at 0. Of all of these formulations, Gavison's third sense
is probably closest to the usage here.
140 See Pungrace, supra note 138, at 1194 & n.16.
191 See id.
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persons as essentially cooperative and communal, focus on other-
regarding rather than self-regarding activities, and contend that indi-
vidual preferences can be transformed through engagement with
others."2
For example, with regard to the claim that prosecutors cannot
serve the public interest, Professor Zacharias' rejection of the "do jus-
tice" maxim and his advocacy for the "assure adequate adversarial
process" standard,"3
 are based upon his acceptance of adversarial
process as the fundamental principle underlying the American trial
system. 144
 While some have argued that the greatest value served by
the adversarial system is its truth-producing function, 145
 the more per-
suasive arguments in favor of the adversarial system have to do with its
ability to protect the individual rights and dignity of the accused."8
The "fight fire with fire" argument against government prosecutors
attempting to serve the public interest similarly takes an adversarial
approach in advocating for the prosecutor's need to counter aggres-
sive defense tactics with similarly aggressive tactics in order to have an
adequate chance to secure convictions. 147 Thus, arguments against the
public interest serving role for criminal prosecutors that are based on
the adversary ethic display a primacy of private over public values.
With regard to the claim that civil government lawyers cannot
serve the public interest, the very notion that there can be collective
interests—as opposed to individual interests—is challenged." 8
 At
most, public choice theory is willing to acknowledge certain aggrega-
tions of individual interests, although there is no acknowledgment
that the process of aggregation will in fact have an effect on the inter-
ests being aggregated. 149
 This argument is taken a step further in the
context of the claim that civil government attorneys should not at-
142 See id. at 1194 & n.15.
143 See supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
144 See Zacharias, supra note 4, at 53-56.
149 See, e.g., DAVID LIMAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 68 (1988);
Zacharias, supra note 4, at 54.
t46. sec e.g., GEOFFREY HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 129 (1978); LUBAN,
supra note 145, at 74, 85; Zacharias, supra note 4, at 55. Note that Luban ultimately rejects
both the truth seeking and protection of individual rights and dignity justifications for the
adversary system, but nonetheless argues that the adversary system is justified, because it is
not significantly worse than any other system designed to determine truth and protect
individual rights, and therefore, the costs of switching to another system would not be
warranted. See LUBAN, supra note 145, at 92.
147 See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
149 See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
149 See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
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tempt to serve the public interest. If individual interests are not ame-
nable to mediation through governmental processes, then the only
democratically legitimate means of governmental decision making is
the plebiscite. However, because it would be impossible to hold a
plebiscite regarding every decision that must be made in the context
of government litigation, the next best solution is to move responsibil-
ity for those decisions to those persons who are most subject to con-
trol by plebiscite—elected officials.
Finally, with regard to the argument that both criminal and civil
government attorneys will not work to serve the public interest, ra-
tional choice theory offers the starkest example of the primacy of pri-
vate values. Because government attorneys, along with everyone else,
will inevitably and necessarily work to pursue their own individual self
interests, we cannot rely on them to serve the public interest even if
we thought it were a good thing for them to do.
III. IN DEFENSE OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST SERVING ROLE
Of course, the dispute over whether there are such things as col-
lective interests, as opposed to individual interests, is unlikely to he
resolved here. However, it seems that if there is any context in which
the notion of collective interests is viable, it ought to he in the context
of democratic governance. Almost by definition, democratic govern-
mental action necessarily involves a transformation of claims of indi-
vidual interest to claims of public entitlement. 150 And if that is so, an
account of the appropriate professional role and responsibilities for
government attorneys would require a greater concern for public val-
ues than the critiques of the public interest serving role seem to pro-
vide.
Additionally, there is reason to doubt the wisdom of importing
whole cloth, into the context of government lawyering, the concep-
tion of attorney professional role and responsibility that has been de-
veloped in the context of representation of individual persons. As I
have discussed in more detail elsewhere, the primacy of private values
that exists within traditional conceptions of attorney professional role
and responsibility when representing individual clients is based upon
"notions of individual 'dignity, privacy and autonomy.'" 151 However,
150 See Hanna F. Pitkin, Justice: On Mating Private and Public, 9 PoL. THEORY 327, 344
(1981); see also ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 28-34 (1994).
tat Berenson, supra note 36, at 41-42 (quoting Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81
GEO. L.J. 2475, 2497 n.98 (1993) (quoting Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal
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such notions have little place where the represented entity is not an
individual person. 152 And where the represented entity is the govern-
ment, which is in at least one sense nothing more than the represen-
tative of all of the people, the supplanting of public values with private
ones seems particularly inappropriate.
Finally, responses are available to each of the critiques of the pub-
lic interest serving role discussed in Part II. Some of these responses
are presented below. In reviewing these responses, the notion of bur-
den of proof should be kept in mind. Part I of this article summarized
the longstanding and widespread acceptance of the public interest
serving position by American lawyers, judges, scholars, and public
officials. Unless we are prepared to accept that all of these persons are
seriously misguided, then the burden ought to be on those who argue
against acceptance of the public interest serving role. As will be dem-
onstrated below, the above-discussed critics have failed to carry this
burden.
A. Lawyers Can Serve the Public Interest as It Relates to Their Role as
Government Attorneys
Certainly, it is unlikely that government lawyers will be able to
identify some sort of overarching, all-purpose definition 'of the pubic
interest that will apply generally across the full range of human
affairs. Indeed, there is no reason to believe that lawyers will be more
successful than philosophers, who are trained to address such
momentous questions, in bridging centuries of disagreement
regarding identification of "the good" or the appropriate ends of
human endeavors. 153
 However, it is not necessary for lawyers to be
able to identify such a grand, overarching conception of the public
interest in order for them to serve the public interest in their role as
government attorneys. Rather, lawyers only need to be able to identify
the public interest in regard to the particular legal problems faced by
them in their work as government attorneys.
Practice, 37 STAN. L. REv. 589, 605 (1985) [hereinafter Rhode, Ethical PersPectives1)); see
generally Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some
Possibilities, 4 AM. B. FouNo. REs. J. 613 (1986).
152
 See infra note 252 and accompanying text.
153
 See generally ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1981). See also W. Bradley 'Wen-
del, Public Values and Professional Responsibility, 75 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 95-100 (1999)
(noting that plurality of values affects questions of legal ethics as well broader questions of
moral philosophy)
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Take, as an example, the prosecutor's duty as set forth by the "do
justice" standard. In his article supporting the "do justice" standard as
an appropriate guide for the professional conduct of criminal prose-
cutors, Bruce Green contends that the "do justice" standard in fact
comprises a series of more specific objectives, which are largely im-
plicit in our constitutional and statutory scheme and follow from our
notions "of what it means for the sovereign to govern fairly. " 154 Green
states:
Most obviously, these [objectives] include enforcing the
criminal law by convicting and punishing some (but not all)
of those who commit crimes; avoiding punishment of those
who are innocent of criminal wrongdoing (a goal which, as
reflected in the "presumption of innocence," is of para-
mount importance); and affording the accused, and others,
a lawful, fair process. Additionally, most would agree, the
sovereign has at least two other aims. One is to treat indi-
viduals with proportionality; that is, to ensure that individu-
als are not to be punished more harshly than deserved. The
other is to treat lawbreakers with rough equality; that is simi-
larly situated individuals should generally be treated in
roughly the same way. 155
Green acknowledges that these various objectives will sometimes be in
tension. 156 However, he contends that prosecutors are capable of re-
solving such tensions in the context of individual cases in order to
carry out the sovereign's objectives. 157
As suggested above, Green locates the source of the prosecutor's
duty to seek justice in the prosecutor's role as representative of the
154 See Green, Seek Justice, supra note 16, at 634.
155 Id. Of course, these still broad objectives have been translated into a series of more
specific rules governing appropriate prosecutorial practice, including the requirements
that prosecutors: refrain from prosecuting charges that the prosecutor knows are not sup-
ported by probable cause; make efforts to assure that unrepresented criminal defendants
are aware of the right to counsel and that opportunities to obtain counsel are made avail-
able; and do not seek to obtain waivers of important pre-trail rights from unrepresented
defendants. MODEL Rot.ts OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8(a)-(c). Prosecutors must
similarly disclose evidence that tends to exculpate the defendant or mitigate the defen-
dant's culpability. See id. Rule 3.8(d); see also Green, Seek Justice, supra note 16, at 615-16 &
nn.33-36.
Is6 See Green, Seek Justice, supra note 16, at 634.
1 " See id.; accord Wendel, supra note 153, at 119 (arguing that conflicts among plural
values in questions of legal ethics can be resolved through the exercise of professional
judgment and the method of casuistry).
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sovereign "—in this country, typically a state or the United States."I 58
By contrast, Green contends that Professor Zacharias erroneously lo-
cates the source of the prosecutor's special responsibilities in the ad-
vantage in power enjoyed by prosecutors relative to defendants. 159
This mistake leads Zacharias to adopt the "assure adequate adversarial
process" standard discussed previously. 16° Green effectively argues that
a role-based conception of the prosecutor's professional responsibili-
ties is more consistent with historical and contemporary understand-
ings of prosecutorial responsibilities than the power-based concep-
tion. 161 Moreover, Green persuasively argues that the "assure adequate
adversarial process" standard that follows from the power-based con-
ception allows for plainly unacceptable results; for example, it could
allow for the conviction of an innocent defendant so long as fair pro-
cedures have been followed. 162
 By contrast, Green's role-based con-
ception of the ."do justice" standard would not tolerate the substan-
tively unfair result of conviction of an actually innocent person,
regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to arrive at such a
result. 163
From the perspective of this article, what is also laudable about
Green's defense of the "do justice" standard is its focus on the exer-
cise of public authority by criminal prosecutors. Because of this,
Green similarly focuses on the public values that are at the core of our
criminal justice system. 164 By contrast, in focusing on the adversarial
aspect of our justice system, Zacharias necessarily focuses on values of
the individual that underlie the system, such as individual rights 165
and dignity. 166
 While such values may be an appropriate basis for a
conception of the appropriate professional role for attorneys who
serve individual defendants in the criminal justice system, 167 they are
not an adequate basis for a conception of the appropriate profes-
158 Green, Seek Justice, supra note 16, at 633.
159 See id. at 629.
193 See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
161 SeeGreen, Seek Justice, supra note 16, at 634-36.
162 See id. at 635.
165 See id. a t 638-41.
161
 See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
16' See LUBAN, supra note 145, at 74.
166 See id. at 85; Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, supra note 96, at 1712.
167
 This fact may account for the generally accepted notions of the vastly different pro-
fessional roles accorded to criminal prosecutors and defense attorneys. See, e.g., LUSAN,
supra note 145, at 58-66; Rhode, Ethical Perspectives, supra note 151, at 605; Richard Wasser-
strum, Lauryers as Professionals: Sane Moral Issues, 5 Huts. •rs. Q. I, 12 (1975).
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sional role for attorneys for all of the people, in the form of the saver-
eign."8
Not only can the "do justice"' standard serve as a basis for deter-
mining the appropriate professional role for public prosecutors de-
spite criticisms regarding its vagueness, but the "do justice" standard
can also serve as an important source for determining the appropri-
ate professional role for government lawyers in civil litigation con-
texts. Indeed, William Simon has gone so far as to contend that the
"do justice" standard can provide an appropriate basis for determin-
ing the proper professional role for public and private civil lawyers
alike. 169 In response to the indeterminacy critique, Simon contends
that most lawyers firmly believe that they are able to make grounded
judgments about notions of legality and justice.'" The fact that law-
yers may not always agree about such judgments does not render
them illegitimate or arbitrary, as the above-described criticism of the
"do justice" standard suggests. Rather, even where lawyers disagree as
to the outcome of such judgments, such disagreements are generally
ascribed to incorrect application of the norms and practices that
ground legal judgment, as opposed to an arbitrary application of sub-
jective preferences.'"
Within Simon's model of legal ethics, attempts by an attorney to
identify justice or legal merit or the public good in legal decision
making are based on the familiar tools of legal practice, such as inter-
preting and applying judicial decisions, statutory and constitutional
interpretation, and understanding and applying the broader norms of
legal culture.'" This contrasts with a model that calls upon lawyers to
base judgments of justice and merit on broader philosophical princi-
ples.'" The former relies on the tools that are the stock and trade of
lawyers, whereas the latter perhaps relies upon the skills of the moral
168 1-lance the practice of referring to the "plaintiff" in criminal cases as "die people"
of the state of x.
169 See generally WILLIAM SIMON, THE PRACTICE °Fiume]: (1998) [hereinafter SIMON,
THE PRAc-rtcE]; William Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lanyering, 101 Ham L. Riv. 1083
(1988) [hereinafter Simon, Ethical Discretion]. Simon's complete formulation is that
"[llawyers should take actions tliat, considering the relevant circumstances of the particu-
lar case, seem likely to promote justice." SIMON, THE PRACTICE, supra, at 138.
170 See Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 169, at 1119.
171
 See id.
172 See SIMON, TIIE PRACTICE, supra note 169, at 18.
170 The best known and most articulate proponent of the latter view is David Luba!).
See generally LUBAN, supra note 145.
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philosopher—skills which lawyers are not trained in and are ill-
equipped to employ."4
However, it is not enough to rely generally on attorneys' capacity
to identify the public interest in determining whether government
attorneys can serve the public interest. One must also account for the
"government" part of the "government attorney" role. Fortunately,
there are also established theories of public administration and bu-
reaucratic ethics that identify ways in which civil servants and other
government employees,can serve the public interest. Perhaps the best
known and most respected of such theorists is Dennis Thompson. 175
Thompson advances a participatory model of bureaucracy as the best
means to reconcile the necessity of bureaucracy to modern govern-
ment and democratic values. 176 It is only through the widespread par-
ticipation of citizens in the important decisions of government that
such decisions begin to address the actual needs of citizens, as well as
provide for democratic legitimacy for such decisions.'"
The participatory model of bureaucracy envisions a variety of
techniques to he employed to involve citizens in the administrative
decision making process. Such techniques include public opinion
polling, notice, comment, and hearing provisions relating to adminis-
trative regulations and even citizen representation on governmental
committees. 178 Of course, such techniques are not often employed by
government attorneys in trying to determine how the public interest
will best be served by specific decisions that such officials must make
174 See SIMON, Ti IE PRACTICE, Snpra note 169, at 18.
G175 See generally, e.g., AMY 6JTMANN & DENNIS F. THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DIS-
AGREEMENT (1996); DENNIS F. THOMPSON, ETHICS IN CONGRESS (1995); DENNIS F. THOMP-
SON, POLITICAL ETHICS AND PUBLIC OFFICE (1987).
176
 Dennis F. Thompson, Bureaucracy and Democracy [hereinafter Thompson, Bureauc-
racy], in DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND PRACTICE 235, 237-50 (Graeme Duncan ed., 1983).
Thompson presents the participatory model as one of four dominant theories that attempt
to reconcile bureaucratic and democratic values. The other three he refers to as the hier-
archical, professionalist, and pluralist models. Under the hierarchical model, most closely
associated with Max Weber, bureaucrats are responsible for executing the policies dictated
to them by their politically accountable superior officials. See id. at 237-41. Under the pro-
fessional model, through expertise and education bureaucrats apply the skills and values
necessary to the proper pursuit of the public good through the large measure of discretion
afforded to them in bureaucratic practice. See id. at 241-44. Finally, under the pluralist
model, bureaucrats respond to interested individuals and groups who are afforded oppor-
tunities to influence bureaucratic decision making. See id. at 244-45. Thompson ultimately
rejects each of these models as failing to provide adequately for democratic responsibility
in the conduct of bureaucracy. See id. at 246-47
177 See id. at 246-47.
178 See id.
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in the course of their work. Nonetheless, it is possible to envision how
such techniques might be employed by governmental legal bureauc-
racies in determining how to best serve the public interest. Indeed, a
number of legal scholars have commented on how such techniques
might be profitably employed by lawyers, albeit in other contexts. For
example, Deborah Rhode has suggested that lawyers use public opin-
ion polling to discover the interests of class members in class action
litigation.'" Likewise, Lawrence Grossberg has suggested electing rep-
resentative class members to a governing committee that will help
make important decisions regarding class action litigation.'" Finally,
William Rubenstein has suggested a variety of techniques for encour-
aging involvement by class members in decision making regarding
class action litigation. 181 Similar techniques could be employed by
government attorneys to encourage citizen participation in their deci-
sions, so as to improve the ability Of such decisions to serve the public
interest.
Critics of the participatory model of bureaucracy contend that to
the extent it has been employed, it has only fostered participation in
administrative decision making by middle class and elite persons and
interests. 182 To the extent this is true, the participatory model risks
converging with the pluralist model, in which representatives of
highly organized elites (interest groups) tend to dominate the oppor-
tunities for participation in administrative decision making.'" While
Thompson and other supporters of the participatory model provide a
variety of approaches intended to encourage a more egalitarian form
of participation in administrative decision making, there is reason to
be skeptical of the effectiveness of such approaches.
However, one strain of the professional model of bureaucracy
provides a promising avenue to address the problem of unequal ac-
cess through the participatory mode1. 184 Proponents of the "new pub-
lic administration" school of bureaucratic governance suggest that
public officials ought to pay particular attention to serving the needs
of disadvantaged members of society, who may not be able to benefit
178 See Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L REX. 1183, 1256
(1982).
180 See Lawrence M. Grossberg, Class Actions and Client-C.enterrd Decisionmaking, 40 SYRA-
CUSE L. REV. 709, 768-69, 778 (1989).
181 See generally William R. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among
Group Members and Lanyets in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE 1..J. 1623 (1997).
182 See TlumnOson, Bureaucracy, supra note 176. at 247.
183 See id. at 245.
181 See supra note 176.
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fully from the opportunities for access presented by the participatory
mode1.185 Proponents of the new public administration argue for the
introduction of egalitarian principles into administrative decision
making. They do so based largely on the RawIsian notion that just
policies must, at a minimum, benefit the least well off in society. 186
Critics of the new public administration argue that bureaucrats
are incapable of determining the interests of disadvantaged members
of society for purposes of administrative decision making. 187 They ar-
gue that the result will be the implementation of individual bureau-
crat's personal policy preferences.' Of course, this argument is virtu-
ally identical to the argument addressed above that lawyers are
incapable of defining terms such as justice and the public interest in
the context of their legal work. Just as lawyers, using the standard
tools of legal analysis, are capable of making grounded and legitimate
judgments regarding questions of justice and legal merit, 189
 so too are
government officials capable of making grounded decisions regarding
the public interest in policy decisions through use of their training in
and the methods of public administration. At a minimum, through a
combination of the justice-seeking approach to legal analysis, the new
public administration approach to egalitarian administrative decision
making, and employment of the techniques of the participatory
model of bureaucracy, I contend that government lawyers can make
legitimate determinations of how the public interest will be served by
particular decisions made within the context of particular govern-
mental legal problems.
As discussed above, the "do justice" standard from the criminal
context has in fact been broken down into a series of general princi-
ples and an even more specific set of rules governing appropriate
prosecutorial conduct. 199 Similar steps can be taken in the context of
civil governmental litigation in order to ensure that efforts by gov-
ernment attorneys to serve the public interest are neither arbitrary,
inconsistent, nor merely expressive of the personal policy preferences
of the individual lawyers involved. For example, in the context of en-
forcement of federal securities laws, a former commissioner of the
185 See Thompson, Bureaucracy, supra note 176, at 243-44.
1136 See generally. e,g, 11. GEORGE FIREDERICKSON, THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRA-
TION (1997).
187 SeeThompson, Bureaucracy, supra note 176, at 244.
188 See id.
189 See Smor	 PRACTICE, supra note 169, at 18.
1 90
 See id.
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Securities and Exchange Commission has written that serving the
public interest in securities litigation requires taking whatever actions
are necessary to assure investor confidence in the public securities
market."' And the Federal Trade Commission was even more specific
in adopting guidelines for interpreting the meaning of the previously
undefined statutory terms "unfair" 192 and "deceptive"193 for purposes
of enforcing its consumer protection mandate under the Federal
Trade Commission Act. 194 Armed with such specific criteria, along
with the general principles discussed above, government attorneys
can serve the public interest in the litigation of individual cases.
B. Government Lawyers Should Attempt to Serve the Public Interest
A response can also be made to the argument that government
lawyers should not attempt to serve the public interest. Given that dif-
ferent arguments are presented in the criminal and civil contexts in
support of the proposition that government attorneys ought not at-
tempt to serve the public interest, separate responses will be provided
here as welt° In the context of criminal cases, as discussed above,
the argument that government attorneys should not attempt to ad-
vance the public interest takes the form of a "fight fire with fire" ar-
gument.196 Because defense attorneys will take all available actions to
secure acquittals for their clients, the argument goes, prosecutors
must similarly be willing to take any actions necessary to secure con-
victions in order to ensure balance in the criminal justice system. 197
However, the "fight fire with fire" argument is only persuasive if one
assumes that securing convictions is the appropriate end of criminal
prosecutions. On the other hand, if one agrees with the "do justice"
standard, then it is not a fatal criticism if prosecutors' efforts to serve
the public interest result in fewer convictions than would otherwise be
the case. To the contrary, the fact that other values may be placed
ahead of obtaining convictions in certain cases is consistent with the
191 See Roberta S. Kimmel, Creating Law at the Securities and Exchange Commission: The
Larlyer as Prosecutor; 61	 Cul-NTEMP. PRons  13 35 (1998).
192
 See International Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1071-76 (1984). Congress subse-
quently added a definition of the term "unfair" to the statute that is consistent with the
F.T.C. Policy Statement. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (1994).
192 See Cliffdale Assoc., Inc., 103 ETC. 110, 174-84 (1983).
194
 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1999).
195 See supra notes 96-112 and accompanying text.
196 See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
197 See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
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fundamental objectives of our criminal justice system. 08 Given that
the "do justice" standard is supported by historical and contemporary
understandings of the appropriate objectives of our criminal justice
system,09
 the "fight fire with fire" argument fails. The fact that, in
some circumstances, defense attorneys may have tactics available to
them that are not similarly available to prosecutors is not an inappro-
priate imbalance, but rather an acceptable result of the underlying
priorities of our criminal justice system.
In the context of civil litigation involving government agencies,
the argument that government lawyers should not attempt to pursue
the public interest, as pointed out above, is based on notions of
democratic accountability and separation of powers. 2°° With regard to
the former, the argument is made that executive branch officials are
more democratically accountable than the lawyers they work with, and
therefore, such officials should make important policy decisions, such
as the decisions that must be made in the course of litigation, rather
than the involved lawyers. 2°1 However, it is far from clear that the
agency officials responsible for a particular lawsuit are any closer to
the source of democratic legitimacy—namely, the electorate—than
are the lawyers involved in those cases.
It is true that federal government agency heads are generally ap-
pointed by the President, who is directly accountable to the voters.
However, in only a very small number of the most important cases will
the agency head be involved in the wide range of decisions that must
be made in the context of a lawsuit. Rather, it will usually be the case
that some subordinate agency official, likely appointed by the agency
head, will be assigned responsibility for the lawsuit. Thus, this person
will be at least two steps removed from the President, three from the
electorate, or even more in large agencies. In many cases, the decision
maker may be a "career bureaucrat" with some form of civil service
protection or tenure, and therefore difficult to remove from office 2°2
and almost completely insulated from democratic accountability.
198 See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
190 See supra notes 154-157 and accompanying text.
209 See supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text.
201 See supra ttote 100 and accompanying text.
202 For example, Thomas Merrill points out that for fiscal year 1990, 99.97% of federal
civil service employees went through the year without any adverse employment action
being taken against them. See Thomas W. Merrill, High-Level, "Tenured' Lawyers, 61 LAW &
CONTENIP. PRO BS. 83, 85 & n.13 (1998).
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If the agency is one that represents itself in litigation, then there
is no reason to believe that the particular agency lawyer or lawyers
working on the case are any nearer to, or further from, the sources of
democratic authority than are the other agency personnel assigned to
work on the case. And if it is a federal agency that is being repre-
sented by the Department of Justice, then there is similarly no reason
to believe that the assistant attorneys general working on the case are
any further removed from the Attorney General, who, like most
agency heads, is appointed by the President, than the agency person-
nel assigned to the case are from the relevant agency head. In fact,
given that the Department of Justice is a relatively "flat" organization
in terms of its bureaucratic structure, it may be that the attorney
working on the case is even "closer" to the electorate than the agency
personnel working on the case. And at the state level, where the gov-
ernment entity is represented by the state Attorney General's office,
the attorney may even more clearly be "closer" to the electorate than
the agency personnel working on the case, because the attorneys gen-
eral in the vast majority of states are elected, rather than appointed. 203
Therefore, it is simply a fallacy to suggest that the agency personnel
who work on lawsuits involving the agency are more democratically
accountable than the lawyers who work on those cases.
Additionally, even if it were the case that agency personnel work-
ing on lawsuits were closer to the electorate than the lawyers involved
in the case, any theory of bureaucratic accountability must also con-
sider.the expertise or capability of the relevant bureaucratic actor to
engage in the action taken on behalf of the people. 204 Judgments
must be made regarding which lawsuits and issues are worth pursuing,
and which disputes ought to be resolved extra.judicially. 20 It is lawyers
who, through their experience in reviewing precedent and their fa-
miliarity with legal procedures, are in the best position to make judg-
ments regarding the likelihood of success of a particular lawsuit, as
well as the costs that will likely be incurred through pursuit of that
lawsuit.
20]
	 General are voted on by the electorate in 38 stales. See COUNCIL OF STATE
Gov'Ts, TILE BOOK OF Tim STATES 33-34 (1996).
209 cf
. J, Patrick Dobel. Personal Responsibility and Public 'wept, 86 MIct t. L. REV. 1450,
1450 (1988) (stating that "a coherent theory of public integrity should accommodate the
range of prudential judgments that individual officeholders must make to perform their
jobs fairly and elficientr) (reviewing DENNIS F. TuomPsoN, Pot.incAL Elutes AND Pun-
LIC OFFICE (1987)).
2" See Harvey, supra note 40, at 1597.
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This is not to suggest that lawyers will be in the best position to
make all of the policy decisions that must be addressed in the context
of any lawsuit. To the contrary, government lawyers are likely to be
less well trained in the art of policy analysis than other agency per
sonne1.206 This seems to point in the direction of the traditional
means/ends distinction employed in the individual legal representa-
tion context, by which lawyers are said to have authority with regard
to the means employed in litigation, while the clients retain authority
with regard to the ultimate ends to be pursued through the litiga-
tion. 207
 And it does seem that the context in which a lawyer represents
a government agency by working with agency personnel who have
been designated to speak on behalf of the entity, most closely resem-
bles the context of private legal representation of any that is likely to
arise in the government context.
Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed,208 we should resist the
temptation to import the ethics of the private legal representation
context into the government lawyering context. Moreover, the
efficiency and effectiveness components of bureaucratic accountabil-
ity demand a different allocation of responsibility. For example, under
the traditional view of private litigation, the client is reserved the
authority to determine whether or not to accept a settlement offer. 209
As described earlier, this allocation of authority is based primarily on
notions of individual autonomy which are not present in the context
of representation of a government agency. Therefore, it seems per-
fectly appropriate that lawyers, who are in the best position to predict
the likely outcome of litigation, play a larger role in the decision
whether or not to settle a case in the government litigation context
than would be appropriate in the private litigation context. Govern-
ment attorney efforts to serve the public interest, in the form of hav-
ing substantial input in determining whether or not to pursue litiga-
tion on behalf of government agencies, pose no particular threat to
democratic accountability and are, in fact, required by it.
Nor do efforts by government attorneys to serve the public inter-
est violate the principle of separation of powers. As pointed out above,
it has been argued that a decision by an attorney in the context of liti-
gation involving a government agency not to pursue a particular law-
2D0 See Peter H. Selma, Lawyers and Policymalters in Government, 61 Law 8c CONTE/vIV.
PROBS. 7 (1998).
207 See, e.g., MODEL RUI.ES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 ant. 1 (1983).
298
 See supra notes 150-152 and accompanying text.
2°9 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT' Rule 1.2(a) (1983).
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suit because to do so would conflict with prior judicial decisions
would amount to a usurpation of the judicial function. 21 ° This argu-
ment seems completely counterintuitive. Rather than usurping the
judicial function, the involved government attorney has exercised
fidelity to the judicial role by following settled judicial decisions. This
would not be the case if the attorney went forward with the litigation
in the face of settled adverse precedent. Similarly, it has been argued
that refusing to defend agency action on grounds that the agency ac-
tion falls outside of the scope of the agency's authority would amount
to a usurpation of congressional power to delegate authority to the
agency.211 However, this argument also seems counterintuitive. Self-
directed efforts by attorneys for government agencies to ensure that
the agencies operate within the scope of their delegated authority
would seem to indicate fidelity, rather than hostility, to such congres-
sional exercises of authority.
Additionally, the suggestion that government attorneys, in the
context of representing government entities in litigation, can and
should hermetically separate any vestiges of legal interpretation from
their law executing function 212
 seems unworkable, impractical, unde-
sirable, and inconsistent with seven decades of legal interpretations in
the field of administrative law. First, it must be acknowledged that, by
necessity, members of each branch of government engage, at least to
some degree, in some of the functions that are reserved to the other
branches in the above-described junior high school civics level under-
standing of the principle of separation of powers. For example, in leg-
islating, it is absolutely impossible for legislators to completely avoid
engaging in interpretation of the Constitution 215--a task said to be
the exclusive province of the judiciary. 214 By the same token, executive
branch prosecutors necessarily interpret the law in deciding whom to
charge under criminal statutes, despite the mantra that legal interpre-
tation is the province of the judiciary. 215 And, although there is wide-
spread disagreement regarding the degree and appropriateness of
such conduct, all would agree that judges engage in some degree of
210 See supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text.
211 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
212 These terms simply come from a junior-high level civics class understanding of the
functions of the three brandies of government; namely, that the legislative branch makes
the law, the judicial branch interprets it, and the executive branch executes it. .
213 See, e.g., John C. Woo, Lawyers in Congress, 61 1,,,kw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1,5 (1998).
214 See generally, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cru tch) 137 (1803).
213 See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 118, at 47.
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law making in addition to their traditionally understood law interpret-
ing function. 216
Just as lawyers representing executive branch agencies have been
criticized for usurping legislative and judicial functions when repre-
senting agencies in litigation, the agencies themselves were histori-
cally attacked on similar grounds for purportedly violating principles
of separation of powers. 217 Particularly, at the time of the beginning of
the modern administrative state, in the context of President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt's "New Deal," legal challenges were brought against
executive branch agencies for allegedly improperly exercising judicial
and/or legislative functions. 2 " Such challenges were largely unsuc-
cessful, and the result has been the development of modern adminis-
trative agencies, which have indisputably exercised functions that in-
clude activities considered to be within the traditional provinces of all
three branches of government, a result which is an accepted feature
of our present constitutional structure. 21g To argue that government
lawyers for administrative agencies violate the principle of separation
of powers when they engage in hybrid functions that have been firmly
established to be constitutionally permissible when engaged in by
other agency personnel seems quixotic at best.
Moreover, to deprive lawyers for executive branch agencies the
authority, in the name of separation of powers, to settle litigation that
is likely to be unsuccessful given existing precedents, or to reject pro-
posed regulations that are likely to be struck down for being beyond
the scope of the agency's authority, seems both wasteful and
inefficient. Recall the argument made above that administrative agen-
cies' democratic legitimacy depends, at least in part, on the agencies'
ability to efficiently and effectively carry out their functions. To com-
pel a lawyer to conduct litigation that the lawyer knows, based upon
her training, experience, judgment, and expertise, is likely to be un-
successful, wastes both judicial and executive resources and is unfair
to the other parties to the litigation. This is also the case with regard
to the promulgation of regulations that are likely to be struck down,
with the corresponding costs imposed on the agency, the courts, and
the regulated parties. Rather than violating the principle of separa-
216 See id. at 61 n.23 (citing Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts,
52 U. Ctn. L. REV. 1 (1985)).
217 See Cass R. Stinstein, Law and Administration After Cheman, 90 CoLum. L. REv. 2071,
2080 (1990).
218 -See id.
219 See id. at 2080-82.
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Lion of powers, our system of democratic accountability requires that
government attorneys use their talents to serve the public interest by
making their best judgments with regard to the conduct of litigation
involving government agencies.
Nor does that fact that government attorneys will not always be
successful in seeking to advance the public interest provide an ade-
quate reason for abandoning the public interest serving role. It is true
that balancing the numerous and multifarious interests that are im-
plicated in litigation involving government agencies requires a great
degree of skill, judgment, and experience. 220 Perhaps the young Assis-
tant United States Attorney in the Brookhaven Nuclear Laboratory
case was not up to the difficult task of balancing the numerous com-
peting interests in that case. 221 However, that case involved a break-
down of the hierarchical structures of authority that must be in place
in order to ensure that more experienced government attorneys share
their wisdom and judgment with newer government attorneys in mak-
ing the difficult choices that are involved in government litigation.
The lines of authority in cases of litigation on behalf of govern-
mental entities are often more convoluted and harder to discern than
might normally be the case in other bureaucratic and institutional
settings. 222 However, the Assistant United States Attorney involved in
the Brookhaven matter should have had to obtain the approval of the
local United States Attorney and at least one or more levels within the
Department of Justice in Washington before going forward with the
ill-fated litigation.223 It is true that, at times, these hierarchical support
arrangements fail to function properly and that much can be done to
improve their reliability. 224 Nonetheless, systems to ensure the partici-
pation of experienced and capable government attorneys in the most
significant decisions to be made in the course of government litiga-
tion should help to limit erroneous actions. Of course, given the in-
evitable fact of human fallibility, even the most reliable systems will
not be able to eliminate all mistaken judgments. But it certainly seems
preferable that government attorneys should attempt to serve the
22° Cf. Wendel, supra note 153, at 100,107 (discussing the importance of judgment and
deep contextual consideration to ethical legal decision making).
221 See supra notes 104-112 and accompanying text.
222 See 1.1.11'. Perry, Jr., United Stales Attorneys—Whom Shall They Serve?, 61 1_,Aw & CON-
TEMP. Pious. 129,136 (1998).
222 See id. at 137.
224
 See id. at 147.
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public interest, rather than abandoning that effort entirely merely
because on some occasions they will fall short of that objective.
C. Government Lawyers Will Work to Serve the Public Interest
The argument that government attorneys will not serve the pub-
lic interest essentially boils down to the contention that government
attorneys will "sell out" the public interest in an effort to advance
their own careers. Thus, prosecutors, who are rewarded for high con-
viction rates, will adopt a "conviction psychology" rather than inter-
nalizing the "do justice" standard. 225 Similarly, attorneys for executive
branch agencies will be overly litigious so they can later cash in on
their trial experience, or they will be unduly timid in their dealings
with opposing counsel who are seen as prospective future employ-
ers.226 Civil enforcement attorneys who envision future careers in the
private sector will act similarly. 227 On the other hand, civil enforce-
ment attorneys who seek to become career bureaucrats will unduly
seek to avoid career-threatening controversial cases. 228 However, each
of these arguments may well overestimate the impact that such pur-
portedly self-aggrandizing activities will have on the future careers of
the government attorneys who engage in such activities.
In a recent article focusing on the Department of Justice's Hon-
ors Program, Nicholas Zeppos challenges the common notion that
government lawyers "invest" in their future careers through govern-
ment legal work. 229 Noting that new lawyers who go to work at the Jus-
tice Department rather than at large Washington, D.C., firms give up
approximately $35,000 per year in salary, 23° Zeppos offers three rea-
sons why such lawyers will not make back that "investment" when they
move on to careers in the private sector. First, Zeppos contends that
the relatively short tenure of new DOJ attorneys makes it unlikely that
they will in fact gain significant experience during their periods of
government service. 251 Second, Zeppos contends that there is no rea-
223 See supra notes 121-122 and accompanying text.
226 See supra notes 123-126 and accompanying text.
227
 See supra notes 129-132 and accompanying text.
228
 See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
229 See Nicholas S. Zeppos, Department of Justice Litigation: Externalizing Costs and Search-
ing for Subsidies, 61 LAW & CONTEM P. PROBS. 171,173-75 (1998).
230
 See id. at 173.
231 See id. at 174. Zeppos points out that DOJ Honors Program participants are re-
quired to make a three year commitment to the positions, but notes that the commitment
is frequently violated without sanction. See id.
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son to believe that the Department of Justice provides better training
for its new lawyers than do private law firms. 232
 To the contrary, he
suggests that the Department may provide poor training for the type
of work that most attorneys perform in the private sector and for the
manner in which Most law firms staff their cases.233 Finally, and most
importantly, Zeppos points out that the available data suggests that
few government lawyers in fact earn back the wages forgone by the
entry into government service when they do move into the private
sector.2M Indeed, most law firms offer a salary scale for associates
based upon the year of graduation from law school. Thus, former
government lawyers who move to associate positions in law firms will
likely earn no more than their classmates who went directly into pri-
vate practice.235 And when such former government lawyers become
partners, they May earn less than their colleagues because they will
have had less time to devote to developing a client base, which is a
crucial determinant of compensation for law firm partners. 236 In fact,
it seems that seniority within the firm is the greatest determinant of
the compensation of partners in law firms. 237
Because DOJ Honors Program attorneys are unlikely to make
back the income forgone by not going to work in the private sector
initially, Zeppos suggests that we ought to think of such persons' time
as government attorneys not as a form of investment, but rather as a
form of "consumption." Such attorneys trade off income for other
goods, which Zeppos particularly identifies as responsibility, intellec-
tual challenge, and autonomy, all of which Zeppos contends are more
available to new Justice Deparnnent lawyers than to their counterparts
in private firms. 238 If Zeppos is right, and his argument. is highly per-
suasive, then his argument provides strong support for the contention
that government attorneys will work to serve the public interest. Par-
ticularly, to the extent that attorneys entering government service
seek the substantial responsibility that conies along with taking on
cases of public import, they will be more willing to engage in the
232 See id.
233 See id. at 174-75.
21I See Zeppos, supra now 229, at 175.
235 See id.
236 See id.
237 See id,
238 See id. at 176-179. Zeppos also acknowledges possible trade-offs between income
and personal benefits such as leisure. See id. at 176 & 11.22. However, Zeppos believes that
the workload for new Justice Department lawyers is sufficient to eliminate this as a
significant motivation for choosing the public over the private sector. See id.
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difficult consideration and balancing of the numerous relevant inter-
ests that makes the task of the government attorney so challenging.
Additionally, what both Zeppos and the critics of the public in-
terest serving position fail to acknowledge is that idealism, or a desire
to serve the public interest, might indeed be a significant motivating
factor in lawyers' decisions to seek to work in public service. 239 To the
extent that this is the case, it presents a strong counter-argument to
the suggestion that government lawyers will not work to serve the
public interest. Indeed, there is empirical evidence to suggest that
persons who go into government work are more idealistic than per-
sons who become private sector lawyers, business administrators, or
even social workers. 24° This data comports with my own experience in
more than five years as an Assistant Massachusetts Attorney General.
By and large, I found that my government lawyer colleagues were at-
tracted to their positions by a sincere desire to serve the public inter-
est, and that their conduct in conjunction with the cases they litigated
was significantly guided by that desire. Of course, this anecdotal evi-
dence is far too narrow and localized to use as a basis for drawing any
grand conclusions about government attorneys' willingness to serve
the public interest. However, I find this evidence to be at least as reli-
able as the unsupported assumptions about human nature that under-
lie the rational choice theory that forms the basis for many of the ar-
guments why government attorneys will not work to serve the public
interest.
D. Public Lawyers, Public Values
At first glance, it seems that the empirical data provided by Mi-
chael Selmi provides the strongest support for the argument that gov-
ernment lawyers will not work to serve the public interest."' Sehni's
contention is that government attorneys are unduly conservative in
pursuit of the enforcement of civil rights because such attorneys ei-
ther wish to avoid controversy to prolong their careers or can obtain
"9 But see Jonathan R. Macey, Lawyers in Agencies: Economics, Social Psychology and Process,
61 LAW CONTEMP. PROM. 109,111-12 (1998) (acknowledging that law students may be
more idealistic titan the general population, and that this tendency may he even more
pronounced with regard to law students who seek to enter government service).
240 See generally Nalbandian & Edwards, The Values of Public Administration: A Comparison
with Lawyers, Social Workers and Business Administrators, 4 A Ityv. OF Pun. ADMEN. 114 (1983).
211 See Sehni, supra note 129, at 1419-20,1443-45.
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more concrete experience in litigating smaller-scale cases. 242 Certainly,
if one agrees with Selmi's unstated assumption that civil rights attor-
neys ought to focus their enforcement efforts on novel or cutting-
edge cases that may potentially result in large damage awards for the
government, then it is hard to argue with his figures suggesting that
private attorneys do a better job than government attorneys in pursu-
ing such ends. However, perhaps Selini too has made a mistake in as-
cribing private 'values to public lawyers.
Keeping in mind that, as government officials, government law-
yers are representatives of all of the people, it is clear that at least one
ground for the democratic legitimacy of the actions of government
attorneys would be widespread consensus regarding the appropriate-
ness of the ends pursued by the government attorneys. This is not the
only source of democratic legitimacy for the actions of government
officials, but it is certainly the least controversial. 243 In any event, when
this fact is taken into account, it may be perfectly appropriate for gov-
ernment attorneys to focus their, civil rights enforcement efforts on
the types of discrimination upon which there is broad societal consen-
sus opposing such discrimination,'" rather than on types of discrimi-
nation upon which there is no such societal consensus in favor of
prohibition. This seems especially true in the areas that Selmi focuses
upon, where there also exists a private right of action so that private
attorneys can continue to "push the envelope" in new and developing
areas of civil rights law, while government attorneys continue to focus
on "bread and butter" civil rights enforcement issues. 245 Moreover, as
a matter of policy, it might well be the case that a larger number of
292 See supra notes 134-137. But see supra notes 229-237 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing why the "resume-building" value of such experience may be overstated).
245 For example, one version of constitutional theory holds that government officials
may legitimately act to protect the rights of disenfranchised minority groups. See Jour]
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A ThEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 99-100 (1980).
2" One example of this type of discrimination would be housing discrimination
against families with children. Selmi is particularly critical of the Department of Justice's
apparent focus on this type of case. See Seim', supra note 129, at 1421,1445.
245 Drawing a distinction between government attorneys and "private attorneys gen-
eral," may present a particularly weak example of the puhlic/private distinction. In his
article The Secret Life of the Private Attorney General, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179 (1998),
Jeremy Rabkin points out that the creation of such private rights of action merely repre-
sents a public decision by Congress as to which rights are to be recognized and which ad-
vocacy groups (such groups being like quasi-governmeni al entities in such instances) will
have the right to enforce them. See id, at 179-80. Nonetheless, there does seem to be a
distinction with difference between government attorneys bringing an action in the name
of the United States or an individual state, and private attorneys bringing actions on behalf
of individual parties.
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smaller-scale civil rights enforcement proceedings will have a greater
deterrent effect on discrimination than a smaller number of the more
complex and uncertain types of actions that Selmi would like to see
pursued. Thus, rather than demonstrating an abdication of enforce-
ment authority, the government attorneys that Selmi criticizes may be
making appropriate judgments as to the most efficient use of their
limited public resources. The fact that such judgments might in prac-
tice prove to be erroneous is not, as argued above, a good reason for
abandoning the public interest serving role entirely.
All this having been said, perhaps the strongest argument against
the public interest serving role comes not from its academic critics,
but from the behavior of certain government attorneys themselves. All
lawyers can probably cite examples of government attorneys whose
conduct in litigation seems to be the antithesis of a good faith effort
to serve the public interest. A disturbing example comes from litiga-
tion in which a colleague of mine at Nova Southeastern University's
Shepard Broad Law Center was recently involved. The case involved a
class action lawsuit challenging conditions in the foster care system in
Broward County, Florida. 246
 The case followed a separate grand jury
investigation and investigative reports in both of South Florida's ma-
jor newspapers exposing numerous instances of physical and sexual
abuse and neglect in foster care placements under the control of the
Florida Department of Children and Families. 247
 In short, the evi-
dence of atrocious conduct within the system and the need for reform
was both overwhelming and indisputable. 248
Despite this fact, the attorneys from the Florida Attorney Gen-
eral's Office who represented the Department took something of a
"scorched earth" or "bunker mentality" approach to defense of the
lawsuit. They refused to respond to reasonable discovery requests in a
timely manner, backed out of a negotiated settlement, and refused to
stipulate to indisputably true facts for purposes of narrowing the is-
246
 The case's primary sponsor was the San Francisco based Youth Law Center. See Sally
Kestin, Foster Care Lawsuit Filed; Advocary Group Seeks Safe Havens, SUN-SENTINEL, Oct. 21,
1998, at IA thereinafter Kestin, Foster Care Lawsuit]. Local counsel included Fort Lauder-
dale attorneys Howard Talenfekl, David Bazerman, and Nova Southeastern University Law
School Professor Michael Dale..
247 See Karla Bruner, Child Care System Fails; Report Faults State Bureaucracy, Public, MIAMI
HERALD, Nov. 17, 1998, at IA; Sally Kest in, Foster Care Crisis Putting Kids at Risk; Children Are
Physically Harmed, Molested, Raped in Homes and Shelters That Are Supposed to Be Havens, SUN-
SENTINEL, May 31, 1998, at 1A.
248 See Bruner, supra note 247, at 1A; Kestin, Foster Care Lawsuits, supra note 246, at 1A.
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sues to be presented to the court at tria1. 249 Certainly, these were not
the actions of government attorneys engaged in a good faith effort to
serve the public interest. 25°
Of course, if it is simply the case that there are a few "bad apples"
among the many good and dedicated government lawyers, then ex-
amples such as the one cited above do not pose a fundamental threat
to the public interest serving position. And, as suggested above, em-
pirical evidence regarding the idealism of government officials sug-
gests that such "bad apples" are the exception rather than the rule. 251
Nonetheless, I also believe that such examples of bad faith litigation
tactics on the part of government attorneys can be attributed, at least
in part, to the inappropriate application of private values to public
lawyers.
As discussed above, the notions of autonomy that underlie legal
ethics in the individual client representation setting, when taken to
extreme, can lead to the kind of "scorched earth," or "win at all cost"
tactics described in the context of the Florida foster care case. 252 And,
despite the firm foundation for the public interest serving role for
government attorneys in both traditional understandings and formal
pronouncements of the appropriate professional role to be served by
government attorneys, the importation of private values into the pub-
lic lawyering context is more than a merely academic exercise. 253
I believe there are two major reasons why some government at-
torneys inappropriately bring private litigation values into their work
as public lawyers. First, many government lawyers actually start their
careers in private practice and therefore develop their understandings
of appropriate attorney behavior in that context. Unless such attor-
neys modify their view of appropriate attorney conduct upon moving
into government attorney positions, the result may be conduct such as
that described in the Florida foster care case. 254 To prevent this prob-
249 Interview with Michael Dale, Nova Southeastern University Law School Professor, in
Fort Lauderdale, Fla. (Feb. 25, 2000).
25° Despite the defense lawyers' "stonewalling" tactics, a settlement was eventually en-
tered into in the case that all parties are optimistic will lead to unproved conditions within
the Broward County foster care system. See Simla Gruskin, Deal Reached in DCF Snit; Child
Advocates, State /Wain! Trial, SUN-SENTINEL, Feb. 16, 2000, at 1B,
Ill
 See supa note 240.
251 See supra notes 151-152 and accompanying text.
2" See'suittra Part 1.
251 Michael Dale also points out that it is increasingly common for government and
private lawyers to work together in the representation of government entities in litigation.
I was involved in at least a couple such "puhlic/private" partnerships during my tenure as
an Assistant Massachusetts Attorney General. The most well known such partnership oc-
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lem, lawyers need to move understandings of the public interest serv-
ing role from the sometimes hortatory and aspirational level of codes
of professional responsibility, to the operational level within the gov-
ernment entities in which government attorneys work. Doing this suc-
cessfully will involve adopting the kind of "mid-level rules" in the con-
text of government lawyering that David Wilkins has argued are
necessary to the regulation of lawyers generally.255 As pointed out
above, some such steps have been taken in the criminal context, in
order to particularize the "do justice" standard into a series of more
definite principles and rules that are capable of guiding the conduct
of public prosecutors in individual cases.256 Similarly, though to a
lesser extent, such steps have been taken in the context of civil gov-
ernment litigation as wel1.257
 Nonetheless, more needs to be done to
implement a set of operational guidelines that can direct the conduct
of government attorneys in individual cases, in pursuit of the public
interest serving role.
A second difficulty, and perhaps a more significant one, is the low
regard in which government lawyers are held generally. Within the
legal profession, despite often sterling professional credentials and
experience, government attorneys are viewed as being inferior to at-
torneys in private practice. As a result, government lawyers sometimes
feel that they need to prove themselves in the eyes of their private sec-
tor counterparts. Sometimes, this results in an undue desire to "win"
cases (as opposed to serving the public interest). Or, this may result in
efforts to show that the government attorney can engage in "hardball"
litigation tactics just as effectively as their private sector opponents in
litigation, even if the result fails to best serve the public interest. Any
effort to ensure further entrenchment of the public interest serving
position will definitely have to involve educating the rest of the bar as
to the different. role of government attorneys, so as to ensure that
cowed when, due to resource limitations, our office joined with a number of private law
firms in order to pursue litigation against the tobacco industry. Dale suggests that the pri-
vate lawyers' values may come to predominate in such partnerships. See Interview with
Michael Dale, mom note 249. •
255 See generally David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for L anyels, 104 HARy. L. REV. 468
(1990). Wilkins, in turn, borrowed the concept of "mid-level rules" from Dennis Thomp-
son's writings in the field of political ethics. See id. at 516, 31. 210 (citing DENNIS F. "'How-
soN, PouricAL Emtcs AND PUBLIC OFFICE 8 (1987)).
2.56 See supra notes 154-157 and accompanying text.
237 See supra notes 169-174 and accompanying text.
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government attorneys are accorded appropriate professional respect
for their execution of such a role. 258
IV. EXAMPLES
What follows are discussions of some examples of how govern-
ment attorneys might comport themselves in pursuit of the public in-
terest serving role as described here. The examples are borrowed
from the literature regarding appropriate attorney role, and are pre-
sented according to each of the primary areas of governmental litiga-
tion discussed in this article; namely, criminal prosecutions; represen-
tation of government agencies; and civil enforcement actions.
A. Criminal Prosecutors
How criminal prosecutors might go about comporting themselves
with the public interest serving role will be explored in the context of
the well known United States Supreme Court case Wheat v. United
States.259 Wheat has come to stand for the proposition that trial judges
have broad discretion to disqualify a defendant's counsel of choice on
grounds of potential conflicts of interest on the part of the attorney. 260
A great deal has been written about Wheat in its aftermath. 26i Most of
this commentary has focused on the tension between a defendant's
right to counsel of choice, and the court's interests in providing a fair
trial process and in the finality of its decisions.262 By contrast, relatively
little has been written regarding the appropriateness of the prosecu-
258 Michael Dale additionally points out that electoral politics, including changes in
administrations and therefore agency personnel during the course of pending litigation,
may also influence the manner in which government attorneys litigate cases. See Interview
with Michael Dale, supra note 249.
"9 486 U.S. 153 (1988).
26° See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, "Through the Glass Darkly": Now the Court Sees Motions to Dis-
qualify Criminal Defense Lawyers, 89 CoLum. L. REv. 1201, 1202 (1989) [hereinafter Green,
Through the Glass Darkly].
261 See generally id.; Randall L. Klein, Sixth Amendment-Paternalistic Override Of Waiver Of
Right To Conflict-Free Conimel At Expense Of Right To Counsel Of One's Choice, Wheat v. United
States 108 &Ct. 1692 (1988, 79 J. Ctum. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 735 (1988); Vanessa Gaston-
Porter, Comment, The Wheat Decision: Patently Incorrect, 19 S.U. L. REV. 491 (1992); Michael
E. Lithowitz, Note, The Right To Counsel Of Choice After Wheat v. United States; Whose Choke
1.5 It?, 39 Am. U. L. REV. 437 (1990); Margai let J. Ryan, Cascnote, The Sixth Amendment Right
To Counsel: A Criminal Defendant's Right To Counsel Of Choice /4 The Courts' Interest In Conflict-
Free Representation: Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 133 (1988), 14 S. ILL. U. L.J. 657 (1990).
"2 See generally Green, Through the Glass Darkly, supra note 260; Klein, supra note 261;
Ryan, supra note 261.
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Lion's efforts to achieve disqualification of defense counsel in Wheat.265
It will be the prosecutors' conduct that will be the focus of the follow-
ing discussion.
In Wheat, the defendant was charged along with numerous other
co-defendants as part of a widespread conspiracy to import illegal
narcotics into the United States. 264 Shortly before trial, attorney
Eugene Iredale notified the trial court that Wheat wished to substitute
Iredale as his attorney or to add Iredale to his defense team 2 66 Ap-
parently, Wheat was pleased with the work that Iredale had done in
representing two other defendants charged as part of the same con-
spiracy, Juvenal Gomez-Barajas and Javier Bravo. Iredale had previ-
ously obtained an acquittal for Gomez-Barajas on charges similar to
those filed against Wheat. In order to avoid trial on a second set of
charges, Iredale had entered into a favorable plea agreement with
prosecutors on behalf of Gomez-Barajas, although that agreement
had not yet been approved by the court at the time Wheat sought to
add Iredale to his defense team. 266
 Iredale had also entered into a
plea agreement with prosecutors regarding Bravo, which had already
been approved by the court. 267
Prosecutors objected to the addition of Iredale to Wheat's de-
fense team on grounds that Iredale's representation of Wheat would
create two potential,conflicts of interest. First, the government argued
that if the court rejected Gomez-Barajas' pending plea agreement, a
trial would have to be held, during which there would be some likeli-
hood that Wheat would be called as a witness against Gomez-
Barajas. 268
 In that instance, Iredale might be required to cross-
examine former client Wheat in the trial of current client Gotnez-
Barajas. The prosecution's second argument against adding Ireclale to
Wheat's defense team involved Bravo. The government contended
2G3 However, it does appear that following Wheat, many prosecutors stepped up their
efforts to disqualify defense counsel on grounds of potential conflicts of interest. See S•E-
PHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS 243 (1999); RICHARD A. ZITRIN CAROL M.
LANGFORD, LEGAL ETIIICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 140 (1995). The post-Muni wend
toward increased efforts to disqualify defense attorneys has been the subject of critical
commentary. See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, Symposium: The New Prosecutors, 53 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 393, 402 & n.61 (1991); Matthew D. Forsgren, Note, The Outer Edge of the Envelope:
Disqualification of White Collar Criminal Defense Attorneys Under the Joint Defense Doctrine, 78
MINN. L. REv. 1219 (1994).
2" See 486 U.S. at 154.
265 See id. at 155.
266 See id.
267 See id.
26R See id. at 155-56.
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that Bravo might be called as a witness against Wheat, and in fact had
offered to modify its position at Bravo's upcoming sentencing hearing
in exchange for his testimony. 269 Therefore, Iredale might be in a po-
sition to cross examine a current client at the trial of another current
client.
In support of Wheat's request to add Iredale to his defense team,
Wheat, Gomez-Barajas, and Bravo all agreed to waive their rights to
conflict-free counse1,270 Despite this fact, the trial judge sided with the
prosecution and denied Wheat's request to acid Iredale to his trial
team. 271 Wheat was subsequently convicted on a number of the
charges, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
convictions. 272 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
regarding the denial of Wheat's request to add Iredale to his defense
team273 and affirmed the lower courts' decisions.
Writing for the five justice majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist con-
cluded that trial judges must be granted broad discretion to deny de-
fendants' their counsel of choice where the potential exists for
conflicts of interest. 274 The Court was unpersuaded by Wheat's will-
ingness to waive any claims arising from a conflict of interest on the
part of Iredale. The Court noted that defendants may nonetheless
claim on appeal that they received constitutionally deficient represen-
tation as a result of their lawyers' conflicts, despite previously agreeing
to waive such claims. 275 The Court reasoned that trial judges' legiti 7
mate interests in not having their decisions reversed on appeal out-
weigh criminal defendants' already limited right to the counsel of
their choice where the potential for a conflict of interest is demon-
strated. 276
Justice Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion on behalf of himself
and Justice Brennan.277 Justice Marshall took issue with the deferential
standard the majority applied in reviewing the lower court's refusal to
allow Iredale to join Wheat's defense teain. 278 Justice Marshall thought
2119 See Wheat, 486 U.S. at 156.
27° See id.
271 See id. at 157.
272 see id.
273 See id. at. 157-58 & nn.1-2.
274 See Wheat, 486 U.S. at 163.
275 See.id. at 151-52.
270 See id. al 163.
277 See id. at 165. Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent on behalf of himself and Jus-
tice Blackmun. Id. at 172.
376 See id. at 165.
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such deference was particularly inappropriate in light of the very low
probability of an actual conflict of interest arising in Wheat's case. He
noted that the government had presented no evidence to suggest the
highly unusual occurrence of a trial court's rejection of Gomez-
Barajas' pending plea agreement.279 Moreover, even in the unlikely
event that the plea agreement were rejected, Gomez-Barajas had al-
ready been acquitted on the charges that overlapped with those
against Wheat. And there was no reason to believe that Wheat would
present any evidence relevant to the second set of charges against
Gomez-Barajas.280
As far as Bravo was concerned, Justice Marshall pointed out that
Bravo and Wheat both contended that neither knew the other, and
that Bravo could not identify Wheat nor offer any relevant evidence
against him.281 Moreover, since Wheat sought as one alternative to
add Iredale to his existing defense team, one of his other lawyers
could easily have conducted any necessary cross examination of Bravo
during Wheat's trial. Finally; Justice Marshall noted that the last min-
ute addition of Bravo to the government's witness list, following
Wheat's request to add Iredale to his trial team, might well have indi-
cated an effort by prosecutors to "manufacture" a potential conflict of
interest in order to keep Iredale, who had been successful against
them in the past, out of the case. 282
Chief Justice RehnqUist's majority opinion and Justice Marshall's
dissent both look at the decision whether to permit a defendant to
waive their right to conflict-free counsel largely from the perspective
of the trial judge faced with that decision. And, as stated above, most
commentators who have discussed the case have evaluated it on simi-
lar grounds.283 However,,as a portion of the Wheat trial judge's opinion
quoted in Justice Rehnquist's opinion makes clear, the trial judge re-
lied on the prosecutor's argument that Iredale ought not be permit-
ted to join the defense team, rather than on an independent judicial
analysis of the competing interests involved. 284 Therefore, it is appro-
priate to inquire as to whether the prosecutors involved acted appro-
priately in opposing Wheat's efforts to acid Iredale to his defense
team.
279 See Mimi, 486 U.S. at 169.
"° See id. at 169-70.
"I See id. at 170.
282 See id. at n.3.
283
 See supra note 262.
284 See Wheat, 486 U.S. at 157.
Judy 20001
	
Public Lawyers, Private Values
	
839
As discussed earlier, prosecutors have numerous interests to con-
sider in the conduct of their work. Of course, their paramount inter-
est is to see that persons guilty of committing crimes are convicted
and sanctioned. Prosecutors must also stay in touch with public un-
derstandings of the severity of different crimes for purposes of deter-
mining enforcement priorities and for recommendations for propor-
tionate sentencing. They must consider the interests and desires of
the victims of crime, although that consideration is muted in "victim-
less" crimes such as the drug trafficking at issue in Wheat. Prosecutors
also have a duty to ensure fair trial processes, including a duty to act,
in some instances, where conflicts of interest on the part of defense
counsel imperil the defendant's likelihood of receiving a fair tria1. 285
On the other hand, defendants' right to choose their own counsel,
given the importance of confidence and trust to the client-attorney
relationship, must also be respected—as must defendants' entitlement
to the highest quality defense available. Finally, prosecutors also have
duties to conserve public resources by ensuring that trial results are
final and are not likely to be overturned on appeal or through collat-
eral attack.
Despite these numerous and often conflicting considerations, it
is hard to see how, given the extreme remoteness of the possible
conflicts raised by the prosecution in Wheat, the prosecutors' efforts to
deprive Wheat of his counsel of choice can be said to have been con-
sistent with the public interest serving position. As noted by Justice
Marshall, the "eleventh hour" nature of the prosecutors' decision to
call Bravo as a witness at Wheat's trial highlights the questionable na-
ture of the prosecution's decision to oppose Iredale's addition to the
defense team. 286 Unfortunately, from all of the circumstances, it ap-
pears that the prosecutors in Wheat substituted the "win at all costs" or
285 In his article Her Brother's Keeper?: The Mosecutor's Responsibility IIThen Defense Counsel
Has a Conflict of Interest, 16 AM. J. CR1M. L. 323 (1989) !hereinafter Green, Her Brother's
Keeper], Bruce Green argues that the prosecutor's first steps upon becoming aware of a
conflict of interest on the part of defense counsel should be to inform defense counsel of
the conflict, and then the court if defense counsel fails to take adequate steps to address
the conflict. See id. at 364. Only if the court is unwilling to consider defense counsel's po-
tential conflict should the prosecutor file a motion to disqualifi, defense counsel. See id.
And then, if the defendant is willing to waive the right to conliict4ree representation, the
prosecutor should withdraw the disqualification motion except in rare and extraordinary
circumstances. See id. Such circumstances might exist, for example, if the defense attorney
were going to be required to be a material witness at trial. See id. at 358. For other exam-
ples of extraordinary situations that Green contends would justify prosecutors in pressing
for disqualification despite the defendant's waiver, see id. at. 353-62.
286 See Wheat, 486 U.S. at 170 n.3.
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"conviction psychology" ethic for the public interest serving position.
And, subsequent prosecutors' use of Wheat as a sword to remove
skilled defense attorneys from cases shows that more must be done to
ensure that the public interest serving perspective moves from the
level of judicial pronouncements and professional responsibility codes
to that of a guiding principle for actual prosecutorial conduct. 287 As a
final point, it is hard to see how the public interest is served by efforts
to deprive defendants of high quality legal representation, absent the
existence of a substantial likelihood of a serious impediment to a fair
trial process. To the extent that the presence of skilled defense coun-
sel makes less likely the. conviction of even guilty defendants (one of
the prosecutors' legitimate interests mentioned above), this is an
propriate price to pay for the preservation of defendants' rights,
which is such an important part of our criminal justice system, and for
the appearance of fairness and balance that is so important to public
respect and confidence in our criminal justice system.
B. Agency Counsel
In his article Government Lawyers' Ethics in a System of Checks and
Balances, Geoffrey Miller presents a hypothetical case in which an at-
torney in the Department of Education is asked to perform legal work
relating to a program to provide federal funds to parochial schools for
asbestos removal.288 The'problem further provides that in a recent 6-3
decision, the Supreme Court struck down, on Establishment Clause
grounds, a program that provided funds to parochial schools to build
fire escapes.289
 Miller also posits that an opinion was rendered by an
attorney general to a prior administration concluding that the pro-
gram proposed by the Department would be both unconstitutional
and beyond the Department's statutory authority. 29° Miller asks
whether it would be unethical for the attorney to work on the case. 29 i
Miller concludes that not only would it be permissible for the attorney
to work on the case, but that it would be unethical for the attorney to
refuse to do so, despite the above-described precedents, as well as the
287
 A relevant step in this direction might be accomplished by adopting Bruce Green's
suggestion that prosecutors' offices establish written guidelines governing the decision
whether to file a disqualification motion. See Green, Her Brother's Keeper, supra note 285, at
353.
288 See Miller, Government Lawyers, supra note 5, at 1293.
"9 See id.
288
 See id.
291 See id.
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attorney's personal conviction that rigid separation of church and
state is crucial to the well being of the American constitutional sys-
tem.292
Miller starts out by rejecting the notion that the lawyer ought to
serve the public interest as implicated by this situation. 293 Consistent
with the "government lawyers cannot serve the public interest" posi-
tion articulated above, Miller contends that it would be impossible for
the attorney to identify some sort of "transcendental public interest"
that would apply in this case. 294 He rightly points out that persons
have legitimate disagreements as to the advisability of the separation
of church and state as articulated in 'current legal doctrine, and for
the hypothetical attorney to follow either position would be arbi-
trary.295 However, if we follow . Professor Simon's articulation of
serving the public interest as being consistent with legal merit and the
values and conceptions of justice that underlie our justice system, as
implemented through conventional techniques of legal analysis and
merit, determination of the :public interest in this case does not seem
nearly so difficult or arbitrary. 296 Given the hypothetical Supreme
Court's recent rejection of a position virtually identical to that of the
Department, as well as the attorney general opinion rejecting the
proposed program as both unconstitutional and beyond statutory
authority, tinder the view of government attorney professional
responsibility advocated here, it would be improper for the attorney
not at least to attempt to get the Department to reverse its position.
Such action would not be, as Miller suggests, an example of the
government attorney following her or his own subjective policy
preferences; but rather, it would be a classic example of the role of an
attorney within our justice system to determine what the law requires
based on conventional techniques of legal analysis and interpretation.
Professor Miller's condemnation of any efforts by his hypotheti-
cal government attorney to get his or her superiors to reconsider
their misguided policy also conflicts with the conceptiOn of bureau-
cratic accountability discussed above, pursuant to which government
attorneys must similarly comport their conduct. 297 As part of his hypo-
292 See id. al 1298.
293 See Miller, . Government Lawyers, supra note 5, at 129445.
294 See id. at 1295.
295
 See id.
296 See SIMON, THE PRACTICE, supra note 169, at 18; Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note
169, at 1119.
297 See supra notes 175-194 and accompanying text.
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thetical, Miller mentions that one of the primary reasons why the Sec-
retary of Education supports providing federal funds to parochial
schools for asbestos removal is to gain political support among the
parents of parochial school children. 298 Certainly, selecting such a•
narrow interest group as the beneficiary of government largesse raises
questions of democratic accountability, especially where the motiva-
tion is to advance a particular official's political aims. This is especially
so where the group benefited cannot be considered to be an histori-
cally disadvantaged group that might otherwise be isolated from par-
ticipation in bureaucratic decision making. 2"
Miller further rejects attorney compliance with the seemingly
clear precedents of the hypothetical Supreme Court and Attorney
General on separation of powers grounds. 30° First, Miller argues that
by suggesting that the agency comply with the recent Supreme Court
precedent, the attorney becomes an advocate for the judicial, rather
than the executive, branch of government, thereby violating the prin-
ciple of separation of powers."' This argument seems to fundamen-
tally misconceive the role of the attorney. One of the primary reasons
persons hire lawyers is to tell the clients whether conduct is likely to
violate existing law. An affirmative answer hardly implies any disloyalty
on the part of the attorney. To the contrary, an unduly rosy assess-
ment of the client's rights would more likely be considered a violation
of professional responsibility, particularly if the client went ahead with
the proposed conduct and suffered legal detriment as a result.
Similarly, it can hardly be said that the lawyer in Miller's example
has served his or her agency client's interests if the agency is advised
to go forward with a program that is subsequently struck down on
constitutional grounds after the investment of substantial resources in
the program, not to mention the resources expended in defense of
the program. It can hardly be said that the notion of checks and bal-
ances requires the right of renegade agencies to conduct policies in
clear violation of law. Miller argues correctly that the possibility of a
change in the law would be precluded if the attorney were not per-
mitted in this case to advocate for adoption of the proposed pro-
grain.302
 However, Miller fails to recognize the familiar distinction be-
tween frivolous legal positions and "good faith argument for
298 See Miller, Government Lawyers, supra note 5, at 1293.
299 See supra notes 184-186,and accompanying text.
300 See Miller, Government Lawyers, supra note 5, at 1295.
301 See id.
882 See id. at 1297.
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extension, modification or reversal of existing law." 505 Such determi-
nations are part of the stock and trade of lawyers that is contemplated
to be considered by the above-described version of the public interest
serving position. In the hypothetical case, it seems that failure to at-
tempt to dissuade the agency from going forward with its proposed
program in the face of such precedent would be bad lawyering in the
least and also improper under any reasonable view of the responsibil-
ity of government lawyers.
For similar reasons, Miller's argument that a recommendation
that the agency not pursue the proposed policy on grounds that to do
so would be beyond the scope of its statutory authority would some-
how amount to a Usurpation of the legislative role 304 ought to be re-
jected as well. Again, interpreting statutes to determine whether pro-
posed conduct falls within or outside of the statute's authorization is
precisely what lawyers do. To suggest that it would be inappropriate
for a lawyer to do so just because ithe proposed actor is a government
agency seems' to ignore the value lawyers can contribute to public pol-
icy decision making.
In his article, Miller suggests that those who embrace the public
interest serving view and conclude that the public interest would be
served by opposition to the proposed program would take the posi-
tion that it would he unethical for the government attorney in the hy-
pothetical situation to assist the Secretary of Education with the pro-
posed program, in the sense that the assisting government attorney
should be disciplined for doing so."5 I make no such contention. I
readily concede that different attorneys may reasonably reach differ-
ent conclusions regarding how the public interest will be advanced in
the context of particular legal disputes under the public interest serv-
ing position. Thus, it would certainly be permissible for an attorney,
who in good faith determines that working for the proposed program
is consistent with the public interest serving position, to be able to do
so without fear of sanction. But by the same token, an attorney who
determines that the public interest serving role requires attempting to
dissuade the agency from pursuing the proposed policy ought to be
able to do so as well without fear of retaliatory action. We ought not
tolerate shooting the messenger bearing bad news in the context of
democratic government.
3U3 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1983).
3°4 See Miller, Government !Augers, supra:note 5, at 1297,
See id.
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Miller seems to suggest further that those who adhere to the pub-
lic interest serving position and conclude that the attorney in his hy-
pothetical case ought to work to dissuade the agency from adopting
its proposed policy would similarly approve covert efforts by the gov-
ernment attorney to "sabotage" the proposed policy if the attorney
were unable to persuade the agency to abandon the policy.306 For ex-
ample, Miller states that the attorney might leak details of the policy
to the press or the ACLU so that the policy is politically stymied, or
the attorney might "sneak" "fine-print restrictions" into the policy that
would torpedo its objectives. 307 I unequivocally reject the notion that
such conduct on the part of the government attorney is appropriate
or ought to be tolerated. The public interest serving position articu-
lated here has no place in it for such deceitful and underhanded
conduct. As articulated above, the public interest serving position in-
corporates good faith efforts to engage in conventional legal analysis
and interpretation, and such covert conduct on the part of govern-
ment attorneys would plainly be prohibited by existing laws, norms,
and standards of bureaucratic accountability.
C. Civil Enforcement
Finally, an example relating to the civil enforcement context
comes from a speech given by then-Professor and future Judge Jack B.
Weinstein, regarding his prior experiences serving as County Attorney
to Nassau County, New York. 308 The particular problem involved con-
demnation proceedings initiated by the county. 309 Though the con-
demnation context seems to be somewhat different from the classic
modern examples of civil enforcement—including civil rights, envi-
ronmental or consumer protection enforcement—in each case, gov-
ernment lawyers initiate legal proceedings in the name of some pub-
lic objective.310 Therefore, the analog), is close enough to be useful for
discussion purposes.
In Weinstein's example, his negotiators had come to him with a
proposed settlement of the condemnation case of a value of approxi-
mately one-third of what the county's appraisers had determined the
306 See id. at 1293.
"7 See id.
9D43 See generally Jack B. Weinstein, Some Ethical and Political Problems of a Government At-
torney, 18 ME. L. REV. 155 (1966) [hereinafter Weinstein, Political Problems].
909 See id. at 169.
910 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property he taken for public use
without just compensation") (emphasis added).
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land to be worth. 311 The condemnees were an elderly couple who had
purchased the land many years earlier, had no idea what the land was
worth, and were not represented by counsel. 912 Weinstein stated in his
speech that after speaking directly with the couple, he was able to
convince them that the land was worth much more than they had
agreed to receive for it pursuant to the proposed settlement. 313
Though it is not clear from Weinstein's speech how the matter was
finally resolved, it is reasonable to conclude that the county ended up
paying the couple significantly more for the property than it would
have under the original settlement proposal. 314
Plainly, if Weinstein had engaged in similar conduct in a private
context without the permission of a private client involved in a land
purchase transaction, he would have been guilty of violating both his
duty of loyaltym and his duty of confidentiality" 6 to his client, How-
ever, as an advocate of the public interest serving position, Weinstein
believed that he owed duties to the condemnees as citizens and con-
stituents, as well as to the county government and to the other mem-
bers of the public who might benefit from a larger sum of money re-
maining in the county's coffers. Just as the public prosecutor under
the "do justice" maxim owes a duty to the defendant to work towards a
substantively fair outcome to the proceedings, 317
 so too does the civil
government litigator owe a duty of substantive fairness to the defen-
dants in a condemnation action. Perhaps, in Weinstein's case, that
duty could have been discharged by recommending that the con-
demnees retain counsel, thereby avoiding involving the government
attorney in the apparent conflict of giving advice to both sides to a
single controyersy. 518 However, I agree that if the condemnee's attor-
ney in that instance was either unable or unwilling to obtain a fair set-
tlement for the condemnees, the government attorney would retain
an independent responsibility to assure a substantively fair out-
conte.312
311 See Weinstein, supra note 308, at 169:
312 See id.
313 See id.
314 See id.
315 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL Comoucr Rule 1.7 ant. (1983).
516 See, e.g., id. Rule 1.6.
317 See supra Holes 154-157 and accompanying ICXL
318 See MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(a) (1983).
319 This is similar to the distinction between Zacharias' "assure adequate adversarial
process" model, see Zacharias, supra note 4, at GO, and Green's "do justice" model, see
Green, Seek Justice, supra note 16, at 634.
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CONCLUSION
For reasons discussed above, the critics of the public interest serv-
ing position have failed to carry their burden of persuasion that tradi-
tional understandings and formal pronouncements of the public in-
terest serving role for government attorneys ought to be abandoned.
While numerous reasons have been presented for rejection of these
critics' views, a common theme among the arguments presented is
that these critics have frequently and improperly imported values
from the context of private litigation into the context of the quintes-
sentially public enterprise of government litigation.
Despite the fundamental soundness of the traditional under-
standings and formal pronouncements of the public interest serving
role for government attorneys, more must be done to assure that the
values implicated by this view are implemented at the operational
level in government litigation, as well as at the formal, theoretical,
and rhetorical levels. For example, career advancement in prosecu-
tors' offices should be based on richer measures of compliance with
the "do justice" standard, rather than simply on conviction rates. Simi-
larly, lawyers who represent government agencies in litigation ought
to be rewarded for settling cases involving indefensible policies, rather
than being regarded as being less aggressive or loyal than their private
sector counterparts for doing so.
Finally, the point must clearly be made that execution of the pub-
lic interest serving role for government attorneys is not the equivalent
of attorneys following their individual policy .preferences as impli-
cated in the context of lawsuits involving the government. Rather, ap-
plication of the standard techniques of legal analysis and merit, bu-
reaucratic accountability, and democratic governance, as embodied in
specific rules and procedures, can provide adequate constraints
against government lawyers running amok in pursuit of their personal
policy preferences. Additionally, hierarchical structures of account-
ability must he put in place so that idealistic, if inexperienced, new
government attorneys can benefit from the wisdom, judgment, and
experience of senior government attorneys in considering and weigh-
ing the numerous, and often conflicting, considerations that must be
taken into account in govermnent litigation decision making. When
taken together, such measures will ensure that public values take
precedence in public lawyering contexts.
